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UNPACKING THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
LESSONS FROM KENYA 
YVONNE M. DUTTON† AND TESSA ALLEBLAS†† 
INTRODUCTION 
Decades in the making,1 the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”) began operating in The Hague, the Netherlands in 2002.2  
The court’s creation left many commentators “hopeful”—hopeful 
that the ICC would positively transform international criminal 
law and reduce atrocities.3  Those high hopes are reflective of the 
† Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of 
Law. The authors thank participants at the American Bar Association Criminal 
Justice Section Roundtable, the American Society of International Law Research 
Forum, and the University of Cincinnati College of Law Colloquium, Rebecca 
Hamilton, Ron Slye, and Margaret deGuzman for helpful comments on earlier 
drafts. The authors are also grateful for funding from The Hague Institute for Global 
Justice to facilitate travel and other logistical support to conduct the interviews in 
Kenya. Dutton also acknowledges financial support she received in the form of a 
DRIVE (Developing Diverse Researchers with InVestigative Expertise) Grant from 
the IUPUI Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research. 
†† Researcher, The Hague Institute for Global Justice. 
1 States began discussing the idea of a permanent international criminal court 
shortly after World War II and the culmination of the Nuremberg trials. Because of 
the Cold War, however, four decades passed until states again turned their attention 
to creating an international court with the mandate to prosecute international 
crimes. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 323–29 (2d ed. 2008). 
2 About, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, www.icc-cpi.int/about (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2017). 
3 See Leila Nadya Sadat, The Establishment of the International Criminal 
Court: From the Hague to Rome and Back Again, 8 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 97, 117 (1999) 
(stating that the passage of the Rome Statute raised hopes that “the normative 
structure being created by international law might influence or even restrain the 
Hobbesian order established by the politics of States”); John Washburn, The 
Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court and 
International Lawmaking in the 21st Century, 11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 361, 361–62 
(1999) (describing the cheers and applause that accompanied the passage of the 
Rome Statute and stating that it reflected the expectation that the ICC “would 
fundamentally change the application and enforcement of international criminal 
law”). 
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Preamble to the Rome Statute,  the treaty that created the ICC. 4  
According to the Preamble, the court aims to ensure that “the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as 
a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution must be ensured . . . .”5  Further, the Preamble states 
the determination to “put an end to impunity for the perpetrators 
of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such 
crimes . . . .”6  In other words, the ICC aims to produce a 
deterrent effect7 through its prosecutions and the threat of 
prosecutions. 
There is, however, a clear divide amongst commentators as 
to whether the ICC and the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals that were established before the permanent court can 
hinder international crime. Supporters of international criminal 
justice advocate for international criminal tribunals precisely 
because they believe that the tribunals can, and do, deter mass 
atrocities.8  The ICC is no exception, with supporters 
emphasizing the court’s role in preventing international crime 
and ending impunity for mass atrocities.9  The remarks of then-
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the day the Rome Statute 
entered into force are just one example of such support.  He said,  
4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Pmbl, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Deterrence theory predicts that the credible threat of legal punishment will 
cause individuals to refrain from committing crimes in the future. See, e.g., 
Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 766 (2010); Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 204 (1968). 
8 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The 
Need for Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 18 (1996) (stating that 
international prosecutions send a deterrence message and thus prevent future 
victimization); Leslie Vinjamuri, Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of 
International Justice, 24 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 191, 192 (2010) (noting that both the 
ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the ICC have cited to deterrence as 
the principle justification for pursuing investigations of international crimes). 
9 Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International 
Criminal Law, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 249, 251 (2001) (concluding that the primary 
reason states created the ICC was because they believed ensuring punishment of 
international crimes would also reduce the incidence of such crimes). 
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“We hope [the ICC] will deter future war criminals and bring 
nearer the day when no ruler, no state, no junta and no army 
anywhere will be able to abuse human rights with impunity.”10 
On the other side of the divide are the skeptics.  Critics 
charge that the people who commit crimes within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction are not rational actors and, therefore, cannot be 
deterred.11  Other critics focus on the court’s institutional design, 
insisting that discouraging international crime is unlikely 
because prosecutions are necessarily infrequent, potential 
punishments are not sufficiently severe, and the path to justice is 
slow.12  Some scholars are even more pessimistic, stating that 
insisting on justice through international prosecutions may 
actually incentivize some perpetrators to continue human rights 
violations or war crimes, thereby impeding prospects for peace.13 
This Article seeks to reframe the debate about the ICC’s 
deterrent effect by presenting a more nuanced understanding of 
the particular circumstances under which the ICC is more and 
less likely to deter.  As a starting point, deterrence is a 
complicated concept.  To illustrate the need to “unpack” the ICC’s 
deterrent effect, this Article takes a deep dive into a narrative-
driven case study of Kenya and its relationship with the ICC over 
time.  Unique to this study is that it includes novel data: 
information obtained during semi-structured interviews 
conducted in Nairobi, Kenya during 2015 with high-level 
subjects, including former government officials, journalists, 
academics, and leaders in civil society, and think tanks.14 
10 James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of 
Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009) (citing Marlise 
Simons, Without Fanfare or Cases, International Court Sets Up, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 
2002) http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/01/world/without-fanfare-or-cases-internat 
ional-court-sets-up.html). 
11 See David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International 
Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473, 476 (1999); see also Frédéric Mégret, Three 
Dangers for the International Criminal Court: A Critical Look at a Consensual 
Project, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 193, 203 (2001). 
12 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Steven D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 132 
DÆDALUS 47, 55 (2003); Wippman, supra note 11, at 476. 
13 See, e.g., Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and 
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5, 20–23 
(2004). 
14 We conducted the interviews in Kenya as part of a multi-year project being 
funded by The Hague Institute for Global Justice and entitled, “The Peace-Justice 
Nexus: The Potential Impact of the ICC on Conflict, Mass Atrocities, and Human 
Rights Violations.” In Kenya, the local partner that facilitated the interviews was 
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Establishing with certainty a causal role for the ICC is 
difficult, if not impossible.  Nevertheless, these interviews show 
how informed actors on the ground perceive the ICC’s deterrent 
effect under varying circumstances and over time.  Combined 
with documentary data about what happened in Kenya before 
and after it ratified the Rome Statute—with a specific focus on 
those who have been targeted by the ICC—this Article 
establishes a new model for evaluating and understanding the 
ICC’s deterrent effect. 
For several reasons, Kenya is a good case through which to 
examine the complexities of the ICC’s deterrent effect.  First, 
Kenya joined the ICC in 2005 following a history of poor human 
rights practices, weak domestic legal institutions, and a culture 
of impunity.15  That poor starting record provides an opportunity 
to seek evidence of improvements as a result of ICC commitment 
and interaction.  Second, in 2007 and 2008, Kenya experienced 
an unprecedented level of elite-driven election-related violence 
that left more than 1,000 dead and up to 500,000 displaced.16  
Thereafter, Kenya became one of the first dozen countries where 
the court intervened to investigate and prosecute.17 
The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) brought crimes 
against humanity charges against six high-level and influential 
Kenyans based on the roles they allegedly played in 
orchestrating the violence in 2007 and 2008.18  Among those the 
OTP charged were Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto who, as of 
March 2013, had become Kenya’s President  and Deputy 
Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa (NPI-Africa). In addition to Yvonne Dutton and Tessa 
Alleblas, Eamon Aloyo, Senior Researcher at The Hague Institute, and Nahashon 
Kariuki, Researcher at NPI-Africa, conducted the interviews on which this Article 
draws. Because of the sensitivity of the topics addressed during the interviews, 
interviews were conducted with the express promise not to identify interviewees by 
name in any reports or publications. 
15 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KENYA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1 (Jan. 2011), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/r 
elated_material/QA%20-%20Kenya%20and%20the%20ICC%2001.25.11.pdf. 
16 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS: ORGANIZED POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE AND KENYA'S CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 2 (Mar. 2008), http://www.unhcr.org 
/refworld/docid/47de7bd22.html [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO 
BULLETS]. 
17 Situations Under Investigation, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://ww 
w.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2017)
18 Kenya, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya (last
visited Aug. 8, 2017). 
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President, respectively.19  In December 2013 and December 2014, 
the ICC prosecutor dropped charges against former Secretary to 
the Cabinet Francis Muthaura and Kenyatta, alleging that the 
defendants had interfered with witnesses and that Kenya had 
obstructed the OTP’s efforts to gather evidence.20  For the 
purposes of this case study seeking to help unpack the ICC’s 
deterrent effects, these facts are useful:  They mean that there is 
an opportunity to obtain evidence of how those in power respond 
to the ICC’s threat of prosecution. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by explaining 
deterrence theory in more detail.  It follows with an overview of 
the debate surrounding the ability of international criminal 
tribunals and the ICC to produce a deterrent effect. 
In Part II, we advance our argument regarding the need to 
reframe the debate about the ICC’s potential to deter.  We 
explain the reasons why the ICC’s deterrent effect must be 
unpacked and, in doing so, we describe several factors that 
influence whether and under what conditions the ICC should or 
should not be able to deter.  In Part III, we describe the 
methodology for the Kenya case study that serves to both test 
these hypotheses and illustrate the complexities of gauging the 
ICC’s deterrent power. 
Part IV unpacks the ICC’s deterrent effect by analyzing the 
evidence from Kenya of (1) any decrease in mass atrocities or 
other human rights abuses and (2) any increase in domestic 
mechanisms available to punish those who commit such abuses. 
That evidence shows that the ICC’s ability to deter can vary 
depending on the particular political context of the targeted 
state, the type of actor the ICC pursues, and based on how 
strongly and well the ICC exercises its institutional powers.  For 
example, case study evidence shows that ratification, the lowest 
level of ICC intervention, did not prevent incidences of mass 
atrocities or other human rights abuses.  On the other hand, the 
case study shows some deterrent effect came as a result of a 
19 Id. 
20 See Statement by ICC Prosecutor on the Notice to Withdraw Charges Against 
Mr. Muthaura, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Mar. 11, 2013), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=OTP-statement-11-03-2013; Statement of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the Withdrawal 
of Charges against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-05-12-
2014-2. 
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higher level of ICC intervention, namely, after the ICC 
prosecutor decided to launch cases against six Kenyans. 
Nevertheless, the evidence also indicates that during that time 
period the increased costs associated with the ICC’s interventions 
may have influenced state leaders to commit abuses to help them 
hold on to or gain power in order to thwart the ICC.  Further, 
while the ICC’s interventions seemed to produce some positive 
effects, the evidence does not confirm any normative changes 
consistent with a lasting and persistent deterrent effect. 
I. DETERRENCE AND THE ICC
A. Deterrence Theory
According to deterrence theory, a well-designed criminal
justice system will deter individuals from committing crimes.21  
There are two types of deterrence: specific and general.22  The 
former posits that individuals who have endured punishments 
because they committed crimes will want to avoid suffering a 
similar fate again.  The latter posits that society at large should 
be generally deterred from committing crimes to avoid the 
likelihood of being caught and punished.23 
Deterrence theory imposes a rational choice economic 
analysis to the study of criminal law.24  The theory assumes self-
interested, rational actors wish to maximize their utility and 
choose the course of action that will produce the greatest benefits 
at the lowest cost.25  It recognizes that each rational individual 
may have some unique and different circumstances that inform 
21 See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former 
Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 737, 744 (1998) [hereinafter Akhavan, Justice in the Hague]; Mark A. 
Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass 
Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 588–89 (2005). 
22 Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for 
Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 63 (2002). 
23 See, e.g., Paternoster, supra note 7, at 769; Wippman, supra note 11, at 476. 
24 See, e.g., Paternoster, supra note 7, at 777–78 (referencing Gary S. Becker, 
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 172–76 
(1968)); Christopher W. Mullins & Dawn L. Rothe, The Ability of the International 
Criminal Court to Deter Violations of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical 
Assessment, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 771, 773 (2010). 
25 Wippman, supra note 11, at 476 (noting that arguments about deterrence 
assume rational actor calculations weighing the benefits of crime against the risks of 
punishment). 
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the cost-benefit calculation.26  Nevertheless deterrence theory 
assumes individuals will make decisions after rationally 
weighing benefits against costs.27  The prediction is that  
individuals will refrain from committing crimes when the 
benefits of the criminal behavior are outweighed by the costs 
associated with being charged, caught, and punished.28 
The cost side of the question is the primary focus of 
deterrence theory; those costs come in the form of legal sanctions 
and social sanctions.  Legal sanctions refer to the potential 
punishments imposed by the criminal justice system.  Social 
sanctions refer to the complementary costs society may impose on 
one who is charged with, or convicted of, a crime.29 
Deterrence theory supposes that individuals will refrain 
from committing crimes when the potential benefits of criminal 
behavior are outweighed by the potential for legal sanctions that 
are sufficiently (1) certain, (2) severe, and (3) swift.30  In other 
words, “Other things being equal, a legal punishment is more 
costly when it is more certain (more likely than not to be a 
consequence of crime), severe (greater in magnitude), and swift 
(the punishment arrives sooner rather than later after the 
offense).”31  The questions of whether a punishment would 
actually be certain, swift, and severe are not the only 
considerations: what also matters is how individuals perceive the 
cost side of the equation.  Thus, “the effectiveness of any 
deterrent depends on the potential offender’s perception of 
possible sanctions, and on her assessment of her ability to evade 
law enforcement.”32 
26 See Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of 
Globalization, 91 IOWA L. REV. 505, 516 (2006) (explaining that the rational actor 
assumption allows weighing unique circumstances, for example, adding in to the 
cost-benefit calculus the fact that an individual is poor or was abused). 
27 Id. at 515. (explaining that according to the deterrence theory’s rational 
choice assumption, individuals are forward-looking and behave so as to maximize 
their utility). 
28 Id. at 519; Paternoster, supra note 7, at 782–83. 
29 See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the 
Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 20–21 (1998). 
30 See Paternoster, supra note 7, at 783. 
31 Id. 
32 Aukerman, supra note 22, at 64. See Paternoster, supra note 7, at 780 
(explaining the evolution of deterrence theory to account for perceptions of objective 
sanction threats). 
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Although the cost side of the equation includes several 
components relevant to the likelihood of punishment, studies 
suggest the most important component is the certainty of 
punishment.33  Empirical research shows that “when offenders do 
not perceive a punishment as likely to be imposed, then there 
will be little disincentive toward offending, no matter the celerity 
or the proportionality of the punishment in question.”34  For 
example, Durlauf and Nagin’s review of the empirical studies on 
deterrence indicates that certainty-based sanctions policies—
such as increasing the visibility of police—as opposed to severity-
based sanctions policies—such as increasing sentencing ranges—
are more effective at reducing crime.35 Although individuals must 
perceive that punishment will be relatively certain should they 
commit criminal acts, the literature suggests that a criminal 
justice system need not punish all offenders for it to produce a 
deterrent effect.36  Exemplary prosecutions may instead be 
sufficient to send an effective deterrence message.37 
As to social sanctions, they add to the cost side of the cost-
benefit equation because they constitute additional consequences 
that may flow from a public indictment, arrest, or prosecution; 
for example, the loss of social or employment prospects.38  Social 
sanctions are not part of the cost equation for every individual in 
every society.  In communities where crime is rampant, 
individuals may face no social stigma or may even find their 
reputations enhanced upon being publicly exposed as a 
33 See Mullins & Rothe, supra note 24, at 773. 
34 Id. 
35 Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be 
Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLICY 1, 14, 37 (2011). 
36 See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human 
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2601 (1991) (arguing that 
selective prosecution of some offenders is sufficient for effective deterrence). 
37 See Aukerman, supra note 22, at 63–64 (noting that deterrence theory 
operates on the premise that even exemplary punishments may adequately prevent 
future crime). 
38 Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General 
Deterrence: A Critical Review, 20 L. & SOC'Y REV. 545, 561 (1986)  (referencing the 
loss of social standing); Keenan, supra note 26, at 536 (referencing shame and social 
censure); Hyeran Jo & Beth A. Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court 
Deter Atrocity?, 70 INT’L ORG. 443, 450 (2016) (noting the potential loss of job 
prospects, not because employment is legally barred, but because many employers 
do not want to hire criminals). 
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criminal.39  Within communities where crime is relatively rare 
and considered morally unacceptable, individuals should expect 
that such public exposure as a criminal will also result in the loss 
of friendships, job opportunities, or social standing.40 
B. The Debate About the Deterrent Effect of International
Criminal Justice Mechanisms
Set out above is the theory.  In the context of international
criminal justice, the theory has both supporters and critics. 
Supporters typically cite to deterrence and prevention of future 
crimes41 to justify the creation of and reliance on international 
justice mechanisms.42  Professor Bassiouni, for instance, states 
that international prosecutions and other accountability 
measures “serve as deterrence, and thus prevent future 
victimization.”43  The ICC’s supporters echo this same sentiment. 
Non-governmental organizations reference the court’s role in 
deterring future atrocities when urging universal ratification of 
the Rome Statute.44  Kofi Annan, former U.N. Secretary-General, 
39 See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 349, 350 (1997).
40 Williams & Hawkins, supra note 38, at 563–66.
41 While many scholars suggest that the role of formal justice mechanisms is to 
threaten punishment so as to prevent future atrocities, others justify international 
criminal justice and punishment based on “expressive theories.” A court’s expressive 
powers relate to its ability to signal through its prosecution decisions that certain 
conduct is contrary to acceptable norms. For example, Margaret deGuzman argues 
that “the ICC may effectively promote important moral norms with a small number 
of illustrative prosecutions,” thereby also contributing to crime prevention. See 
Margaret deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the 
International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 312, 315 (2012). 
42 See, e.g., Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial 
Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L. & POL. 
583, 605 (2007) (noting that one commonly expressed hope for the ICC is that it will 
generally deter future criminal activity); Vinjamuri, supra note 8, at 192 
(referencing deterrence as the rationale for international justice investigations). 
43 Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 18. 
44 See, e.g., About Us, THE AMERICAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.amicc.org/about-
us (“We share in common the conviction that perpetrators of atrocities must be held 
accountable by the international community and that victims of these terrible crimes 
deserve justice.”); Genocide, ICC NOW, http://iccnow.org/documents/FS-
ICCandGenocide.pdf (“The ICC therefore stands as a deterrent against future 
atrocities, and empowers the international community to react more rapidly through 
an impartial, international judicial mechanism”); Statement by William R. Pace 
Convenor, Coalition for the International Criminal Court for the 15th session of the 
Assembly of States Parties, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/GenDeba/ 
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emphasized the ICC’s hoped-for deterrent effect in his remarks 
following the adoption of the Rome Statute.45  The ICC’s first 
prosecutor himself has noted that his mission according to the 
Rome Statute is to end impunity for mass atrocities “in order to 
contribute to the prevention of future crimes.”46 
The critics do not dispute that deterrence and prevention of 
future crimes is an oft-cited rationale for employing international 
justice. They dispute that international tribunals, including the 
ICC, can prevent future crimes through its threat of punishment. 
Some critics focus on the “rational actor” assumption, arguing 
that the types of people who commit serious international crimes 
within the ICC’s jurisdiction are not rational actors, and 
therefore, cannot be deterred.47  In particular, the assumption of 
rationality may not always be valid where the context is “the 
chaos of massive violence, incendiary propaganda, and upended 
social order.”48  The argument is that under such circumstances 
individuals may give little or no thought to the cost side of the 
equation: they may be driven by political paranoia, genocidal 
fanaticism, or swept up in some supremacist euphoria.49  
Mégret’s quote is illustrative: “It beggars belief to suggest that  
ICC-ASP15-GenDeba-NGO-CICC-ENG.pdf (“There is an urgent need to both end 
and deter these most serious crimes of concern to the international community, and 
to eradicate impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes.” “The Court plays a 
central role in peace-building processes as the only permanent international 
criminal court within an evolving system of international criminal justice, not least 
through the Court’s contribution to guaranteeing lasting respect for, and the 
enforcement of, international justice.”); Wippman, supra note 11, at 473 (stating that 
the ICC’s supporters routinely reference the court’s role in deterring future atrocities 
when urging states to ratify). 
45 See Alexander, supra note 10, at 10. 
46 Pursuing International Justice: A Conversation with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/ 
pursuing-international-justice-conversation-luis-moreno-ocampo/p34702. 
47 See, e.g., Mégret, supra note 11, at 194; see also Payam Akhavan, Are 
International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial 
Romanticism with Political Realism, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 624, 628 (2009) (“Some would 
argue that the all-consuming primordial hatreds that motivate genocide defy the 
simplistic rationalist assumption of cost-benefit calculus by perpetrators upon which 
modern deterrence theories are based.”) [hereinafter Akhavan, Reconciling]. 
48 Drumbl, supra note 21, at 590. 
49 See id. at 591 (querying rhetorically whether individuals imbued with 
political paranoia will be able to view their actions as legally or morally wrong or 
whether the genocidal fanatics engage in cost-benefit calculations). 
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the average crazed nationalist purifier . . . will be deterred by the 
prospect of facing trial.”50  Therefore, in some contexts, rational 
choice may not be entirely possible.51 
Critics reference another alleged problem with assuming 
rationality in the mass atrocity context.  At the time of action, 
“moral norms may compel commission of crime more than fear 
can deter them.”52  Mass atrocities are only possible because a 
large swath of society participates in killing, raping, arson, or 
other criminal behavior.53  In that context, individuals may view 
their crimes as morally justifiable or necessary.54  Refusing to 
commit the criminal act in the context of mass atrocities, as 
commentators have noted, might even be regarded as socially 
deviant behavior.55  Thus, social deterrence may have limited or 
no relevance.  In addition, in such circumstances some 
individuals are likely to exaggerate the perceived “benefits” of 
their violent acts. 
Other critiques focus on the cost side of deterrence theory’s 
cost-benefit calculus.  Some commentators argue that 
international criminal tribunals can produce little or no 
deterrent effect because they are not capable of sending a signal 
that those who commit mass atrocities or other human rights 
abuses will likely be punished.56  According to Wippman, “Even if 
we assume that those committing atrocities engage in rational 
cost-benefit calculations . . . most probably view the risk of 
50 Mégret, supra note 11, at 203. 
51 Drumbl, supra note 21, at 591 (suggesting that in “the cataclysm of mass 
violence,” rational choice may not be possible). 
52 Pádraig McAuliffe, Suspended Disbelief? The Curious Endurance of the 
Deterrence Rationale in International Criminal Law, 10 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 227, 
238 (2012). 
53 See Drumbl, supra note 21, at 567 (noting that extraordinary international 
crimes have “an organic and group component”). 
54 See id. at 591; see also id. at 569–70 (suggesting that in the context of the 
Rwandan genocide, the previous normative structure was suspended and replaced 
by a normative structure whereby killing became a civic duty). 
55 See McAuliffe, supra note 52, at 238; Drumbl, supra note 21, at 568. 
56 Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or 
Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 832 (2006) (arguing 
that international criminal tribunal prosecutions are not likely to produce any 
meaningful deterrent effect because of the small numbers of persons prosecuted and 
because the tribunals face constraints in administering sanctions); Drumbl, supra 
note 21, at 590 (arguing that although “the chances of ‘getting caught’ for 
committing egregious violations of human rights” have increased, they are still 
“tiny”). 
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prosecution as slight.”57  To support this position, he references 
data from the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”), an institution that in six years issued some ninety-one 
indictments and sentenced some six individuals.58  Wippman 
asserts that these numbers are “minuscule relative to the 
numbers of persons actually responsible for criminal violations of 
international humanitarian law.”59  Other commentators offer 
more general observations, arguing that in the absence of an 
international criminal police force, an individual’s chance of 
being arrested by an international criminal tribunal is less than 
that of being arrested for a crime in a domestic jurisdiction with 
a functioning democracy.60  Referencing that same lack of a police 
force, Drumbl states that while the chance an individual will be 
prosecuted for committing egregious violations of human rights 
are higher now that the international justice paradigm has been 
institutionalized, the chance “still remains tiny.”61 
Although the ICC’s institutional design differs from that of 
the ad hoc international tribunals, critics have specifically 
challenged its ability to deliver a credible threat of certain 
punishment.  Goldsmith and Krasner argue that it is “wishful 
thinking” that the ICC will “save many lives” in the future, 
because, among other things, the ICC lacks a police force to 
arrest the offenders who will hide behind national borders.62  
57 Wippman, supra note 11, at 476; see also Diane Marie Amann, Assessing 
International Criminal Adjudication of Human Rights Atrocities, 16 THIRD WORLD 
LEGAL STUD. 169, 174 (2003) (stating that lack of resources and political 
considerations tend to preclude international criminal tribunals from prosecuting 
more than a few individuals, the result being that the rational individual may not be 
deterred by the cost side of the cost-benefit calculus). 
58 Wippman, supra note 11, at 476; see also Greenawalt, supra note 42, at 610 
(suggesting that the number of individuals prosecuted by the ICTY was small since 
after thirteen years in operation, the tribunal had prosecuted ninety-four individuals 
and had indicted another sixty-seven who were either in custody or at large). 
59 Wippman, supra note 11, at 476. Now that the ICTY has been operating for 
over 20 years, the numbers that Wippman cites have gown. As of February 2016, the 
ICTY has brought 161 indictments and sentenced eighty-three individuals. See Key 
Figures of the Cases, UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2017). 
60 McAuliffe, supra note 52, at 237. 
61 Drumbl, supra note 21, at 590. 
62 Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 12, at 55; see also Jack Goldsmith, The Self-
Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 92–94 (2003) (arguing 
that since the ICC depends on states to arrest and transfer defendants, the court 
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Wippman argues that the ICC will at best produce a modest 
deterrent effect because it will not have sufficient resources or 
broad enough political support to obtain jurisdiction over 
suspects.63  Greenawalt states that the ICC’s jurisdictional limits 
and its dependence on states present impediments to the court’s 
ability to obtain jurisdiction over offenders; as a result of those 
circumstances, Greenawalt finds that the ICC fails to send an 
effective deterrence message.64  Likewise, Mullins and Rothe 
emphasize that the ICC cannot obtain jurisdiction over non-state 
parties without a Security Council referral.  They argue that 
states with veto powers or strong allies are guaranteed virtual 
immunity from ICC prosecution, thereby negating the certainty 
of punishment at least for actors in some parts of the world and 
reducing the court’s ability to effectively deter.65 
Finally, some scholars are even more pessimistic about the 
prospects for deterrence in the context of international criminal 
justice, arguing that pursuing charges against government or 
rebel actors while conflicts are ongoing may perversely impede 
prospects for peace.66  There is a broad discussion known as the 
“peace versus justice debate” in the application of international 
criminal law, conflict resolution, and conflict prevention that 
postulates there may be a tradeoff between prosecution and the 
realization of peace and the protection of human rights.67  In this 
debate, “peace” refers to ending war and mass atrocities and 
preventing them from occurring again in the future. “Justice” 
generally refers to retributive criminal justice.68 
lacks the institutional resources to ensure that indicted defendants actually appear 
in The Hague). 
63 Wippman, supra note 11, at 484–85; see also Mullins & Rothe, supra note 24, 
at 778 (stating that the certainty of punishment is reduced because the ICC is 
dependent on state parties and allied organizations to obtain custody over suspects). 
64 Greenawalt, supra note 42, at 606. 
65 Mullins & Rothe, supra note 24, at 777. 
66 See, e.g., Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 13, at 5. 
67 See, e.g., MARK KERSTEN, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT: THE EFFECTS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S INTERVENTION ON ENDING WARS AND BUILDING 
PEACE 4 (2016); Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 21, at 738 (referring to 
“peace versus accountability”); Janine Natalya Clark, Peace, Justice and the 
International Criminal Court: Limitations and Possibilities, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
521, 521–22 (2011); Adam Branch, Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC 
Intervention, 21 ETHICS & INT’L AFFS. 179, 179 (2007); Catherine Gegout, The 
International Criminal Court: Limits, Potential and Conditions for the Promotion of 
Justice and Peace, 34 THIRD WORLD Q. 800, 810 (2013). 
68 Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 21, at 740. 
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On the one hand, an international court or tribunal can have 
a positive impact on “peace” through prosecutions that 
potentially marginalize perpetrators, induce parties to enter 
peace negotiations, or deter others.  That same court or tribunal 
could impede peace processes by creating perverse incentives 
that encourage perpetrators to continue or resume war or human 
rights violations.69  Therefore, insisting on justice can back 
abusers into a corner and cause them to feel they have little 
reason to refrain from committing atrocities if their only other 
viable option is to be arrested and prosecuted—as opposed to, for 
example, being offered amnesty.70  To illustrate the point, some 
commentators argue that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1970, 
which referred the Libya situation to the ICC in 2011, impeded a 
political solution of a negotiated exit for Gaddafi and instead 
forced him to fight to the end.71 
II. REFRAMING THE DEBATE ABOUT THE ICC’S DETERRENT
EFFECT 
We suggest that although the debate about the ICC’s likely 
deterrent effect thus far has been useful, the time has come to 
reframe the debate.  We argue for a broader consideration and 
greater understanding of how deterrence works and what factors 
or circumstances will affect the likelihood of deterrence.  We 
begin that reframing below.  First, we address the ICC’s critics, 
laying out the reasons why we expect that the ICC can effectively 
deter at least as to some actors in some situations.  Because we 
are interested in unpacking the ICC’s deterrent effect and 
69 See, e.g., Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 13, at 12, 20–23; Goldsmith & 
Krasner, supra note 12, at 51; see also KERSTEN, supra note 67, at 27 (noting that 
critics of wars crimes trials argue that instead of marginalizing perpetrators, judicial 
interventions may instead cause targets to (re)commit to violence). 
70 See Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 12, at 55 (arguing that by seeking to 
prosecute, the ICC could aggravate conflicts and prolong political instability); 
Branch, supra note 67, at 183–84 (explaining that proponents of the ICC’s 
intervention in Uganda believe the intervention will aid in ending civil war, but that 
critics argue that arrest warrants will cause rebels to abandon peace talks). 
71 See, e.g., Leslie Vinjamuri & Jack Snyder, ICC Sheriff Too Quick on the Draw, 
DUCK OF MINERVA (May 9, 2011), http://duckofminerva.com/2011/05/icc-sheriff-too-
quick-on-draw.html; Mark Kersten, Libya, Peace and Justice: ‘Gaddafi Has To Go,’ 
but Peace Must Be Negotiated, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Apr. 18, 2011), 
https://justiceinconflict.org/2011/04/18/libya-peace-and-justice-gaddafi-has-to-go-but-
peace-must-be-negotiated/ (outlining the peace versus justice arguments advanced 
with respect to the Libya situation). 
2017] DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE ICC 119
embracing nuances, however, we describe some factors that we 
argue can influence whether the ICC is more or less likely to 
deter.  Those factors include (1) the domestic political context, 
(2) the type of actor the ICC is targeting, and (3) the level of the
ICC’s intervention.
A. The ICC Can Effectively Deter—At Least as to Some Actors in
Some Situations
Notwithstanding the arguments laid out above about the
limited ability of international criminal tribunals to deter, we 
suggest that the ICC can effectively deter at least some actors 
some of the time.  We do not wholly disagree with all of the 
critiques raised regarding the potential deterrent power of the 
ICC.  Nevertheless the criticisms do not unequivocally require a 
conclusion that the ICC cannot sometimes effectively deter. 
First, regarding the rational actor assumption, no doubt 
some individuals are irrational sometimes and cannot be 
deterred by the threat of sanctions.  This is true in both the 
domestic and international criminal justice contexts.  For 
instance, some evidence shows that the threat of punishment 
does not effectively deter those who commit crimes in the heat of 
passion.72 
Yet not all individuals who commit international crimes are 
necessarily irrational all the time:  Not all are megalomaniacs or 
caught in some frenzy of activity that causes them to believe that 
their violent acts are nevertheless moral.  Aukerman, for 
example, distinguishes between “manipulators,” such as 
Slobodan Milosevic, and “fanatics,” such as Hitler.  While 
fanatics may not engage in a rational cost-benefit analysis, 
manipulators make the rational choice to commit horrific 
crimes.73  Mullins and Rothe point out that governments and 
quasi-governmental systems do commit mass atrocities, with 
individuals within bureaucracies planning those actions in order 
to achieve a set of goals.  In such circumstances, senior 
leadership who spend “a great amount of rational energy in 
72 Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal 
Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 291 (2006) (“No one 
doubts that the criminal law, as well as other types of legal sanctions, have 
deterrent effects, but the evidence suggests that such effects may be confined to risk 
groups atypical of homicide offenders” who act out of passion). 
73 Aukerman, supra note 22, at 68. 
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plotting and planning such an event” likely also think about 
“potential criminal responsibility.”74  In fact, new research by 
political scientists rejects the “once widely held view that large 
scale violence against civilian populations was irrational, 
random, or the result of ancient hatreds between ethnic 
groups.”75  Valentino’s survey of political science literature on 
violence against civilians, including genocide, mass violence, and 
terrorism shows that “most scholars studying political 
violence . . . understand it to be primarily, if not exclusively, 
instrumental and coordinated by powerful actors seeking to 
achieve tangible political or military objectives.”76 
Second, as to the cost side of the equation, we recognize that 
like other international criminal tribunals the ICC will not be 
able to prosecute every individual who plays a role in committing 
a crime ostensibly within the court’s jurisdiction.  Domestic 
criminal justice systems similarly cannot arrest and bring to 
justice every person who commits a crime.77  Still, the ICC has 
strong enforcement powers to credibly signal a threat of 
prosecution.78  It is a permanent court without temporal or 
geographical jurisdictional limitations.79  The court’s permanence 
alone adds a threat that should translate into greater 
deterrence.80  Individuals may believe that states would not 
74 Mullins & Rothe, supra note 24, at 775. 
75 Benjamin Valentino, Why We Kill: The Political Science of Political Violence 
Against Civilians, 17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 89, 91 (2014). 
76 Id. 
77 In fact, in the domestic context many crimes go unreported which also means 
that many individuals who commit crimes are not arrested and prosecuted. For 
example, research reveals that about one-half of violent crimes committed between 
the period 2006 and 2010 went unreported. See Press Release, Bureau of Just. Stat., 
Nearly 3.4 Million Violent Crimes Went Unreported to Police from 2006 to 2010, 
(Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/vnrp0610pr.cfm. 
78 Jo and Simmons also argue that the ICC’s design features should enable it to 
produce a deterrent effect. Jo & Simmons, supra note 38, at 449 (“ICC 
investigations, indictments, and convictions or those triggered by complementarity 
are likely to encourage actual or potential perpetrators to reassess the risks of 
punishment—relative to the status quo, which is often impunity—and to moderate 
their behavior.”). 
79 Id. at 451. 
80 See, e.g., Kate Cronin-Furman, Managing Expectations: International 
Criminal Trials and the Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity, 7 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 434, 440–41 (2013) (stating that the ICC, “with its potentially 
unlimited geographic jurisdiction . . . and prospective temporal jurisdiction” 
represents a more likely institution than the ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
“for triggering a deterrent effect”); Akhavan, Reconciling, supra note 47, at 634 
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spend the time or money to create a new ad hoc tribunal to 
address a mass atrocity; but the ICC already exists.81  The 
existence of the ICC thus means that the Security Council has a 
ready-made institution to which to refer situations, and it has 
done so in the situations of Sudan and Libya. 
We suggest that the ICC has been designed with broad legal 
authority and strong enforcement powers to signal a credible 
threat of prosecution.  By committing to the ICC, states grant the 
court automatic jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.82  Moreover, states agree that 
an independent ICC prosecutor may try a state’s own nationals 
for mass atrocities should the ICC determine that the state is 
unwilling or unable to do so domestically.83  These powers are 
significantly greater than those typically seen in human rights 
treaties:  Those treaties generally only require that states self-
report compliance and contain no mechanism to punish non-
compliant behavior.84  The ICC also has more extensive 
jurisdiction and influence compared to the various international 
ad hoc criminal tribunals.  The ad hoc tribunals do prosecute 
individuals, but they have geographic and temporal limitations 
focusing on crimes committed within a specific time frame on a 
specific territory, that of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
respectively.85  Indeed, as Jo and Simmons note, by ratifying the 
Rome Statute creating the ICC, states have necessarily increased 
the possibility that their citizens will face an international 
criminal prosecution.86 
Thus, the ICC has the power to investigate crimes, issue 
arrest warrants, and prosecute and sentence perpetrators of 
mass atrocities.  And the court has exercised these powers during 
its fifteen years in operation.  As of August 2017, the ICC has 
brought charges against individuals in twenty-five cases based 
(“Given the ICC’s permanent status, its preventive capacity is at least notionally 
enhanced because, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, there is no lapse of time between the 
commission of atrocities and the establishment of its jurisdiction.”). 
81 See YVONNE M. DUTTON, RULES, POLITICS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: COMMITTING TO THE COURT 3 (Routledge 2013).  
82 Rome Statute, supra note 4, at arts. 5–8, 11, 12(2). 
83 Id. at arts. 5–8, 11, 12(2), 13. 
84 DUTTON, supra note 81, at 15–17 (detailing the oversight and compliance 
mechanisms in the various international human rights treaties). 
85 Id. at 19–20 (comparing the powers of the ad hoc tribunals to those of the 
ICC).  
86 Jo and Simmons, supra note 38, at 445–46. 
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on ten “situations.”87  To date, the ICC has issued about thirty 
arrest warrants.88  Two of the individuals charged with 
committing international crimes have been convicted and 
sentenced:  In 2012, the court sentenced Congolese warlord 
Thomas Lubanga to fourteen years imprisonment for war crimes 
based on his role in conscripting child soldiers.89  In 2014, the 
court sentenced Germain Katanga to twelve years imprisonment 
for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.90 
Critics would argue that these numbers are not significant. 
Yet the numbers demonstrate that the ICC is using its powers to 
prosecute.  For individuals who were accustomed to the status 
quo of impunity and considered themselves “untouchable,” the 
risk of investigation and prosecution has increased.91 
Critics would likewise argue that the ICC has not obtained 
custody over every one of the individuals against whom arrest 
warrants have been issued.  Absent a voluntary surrender, the 
ICC must rely on states to capture and transfer suspects.  We 
make several points in response.  First, some suspects have 
voluntarily surrendered, and states have aided in the capture 
and transfer of others.92  Second, the public signal of a legally-
87 Those situations include Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(“DRC”), the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, Libya, Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire, 
and Central African Republic II. See Situations Under Investigation, 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/cases.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2017). 
88 See Office of the Prosecutor, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www. 
icc-cpi.int/Pages/defendants-wip.aspx (listing the names of defendants against whom 
the ICC issued arrest warrants). 
89 See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
Sentenced to 14 Years of Imprisonment (July 10, 2012), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/drc/lubanga/Documents/LubangaEng.pdf. 
90 See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Germaine Katanga 
Sentenced to 12 Years’ Imprisonment (May 23, 2014), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/drc/katanga/Documents/KatangaEng.pdf. 
91 See Jo & Simmons, supra note 38, at 452 (noting that while the absolute risk 
of being punished by the ICC is small, it “is much higher than was the case when 
impunity was the default”). 
92 In fact, all six of the original Kenyan suspects voluntarily appeared in The 
Hague to face charges in April 2011 after receiving summonses to appear. Cases & 
Situations: Kenya, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=kenya&idudctp=20&show=all. For a list of the six 
individuals over whom states have obtained custody, see Office of the Prosecutor, 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/defendants-
wip.aspx. 
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issued warrant for arrest—even if it goes unexecuted—still 
contributes to the ICC’s ability to send an effective deterrence 
message.  Suspects may escape arrest by staying within their 
country’s own borders or visiting only friendly states.  President 
Bashir has been able to travel to some “friendly” countries in the 
past, including Kenya, without being arrested.93  On the other 
hand, the evidence demonstrates that the pending arrest warrant 
has placed limits on Bashir’s freedom.  He has not traveled to the 
United States or Europe.  In 2013, Bashir threatened to attend a 
meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, but he 
canceled the trip after the United States repeatedly warned that 
it could not guarantee he would not be arrested.94  In only June 
2015, Bashir visited South Africa, but was forced to flee while a 
South African court considered whether the country was 
obligated to arrest him.95  Indeed, one interviewee, a former 
government official in Kenya, made a similar point about 
Bashir’s restrictions because of the ICC in emphasizing that the 
Sudanese president departed from a South African military base 
so as to avoid a citizens’ arrest.96  In short, even unexecuted 
warrants impose restrictions that some may wish to avoid by not 
committing crimes that could subject them to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. 
Another feature of the ICC’s design is also important to the 
deterrence calculus:  The fact that the ICC’s jurisdiction is 
complementary.  The court may only obtain jurisdiction as a last 
resort if the state does not initiate domestic prosecutions to hold 
perpetrators of the covered crimes accountable.97  The 
complementarity provision necessarily operates to limit the ICC’s 
exercise of jurisdiction.  However, the complementarity principle  
93 Peter Leftie & Kevin Kelly, Storm over al-Bashir’s Surprise Visit, DAILY 
NATION (Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.nation.co.ke/Kenya%20Referendum/Storm%20 
over%20al%20Bashir%20/-/926046/998960/-/69nwjj/-/. 
94 Colum Lynch, Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir Cancels U.N. Trip, FOREIGN POLICY 
(Sept. 25, 2013, 6:34 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/25/sudans-omar-al-
bashir-cancels-u-n-trip-2/. 
95 South Africa Criticised over Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir’s Exit, BBC NEWS (June 
24, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33254003. 
96 Interview with Subject 898. 
97 Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 17 (providing that the ICC may exercise 
jurisdiction over the covered crimes if the state is “unwilling or unable genuinely” to 
proceed domestically). 
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also arguably increases the ICC’s potential deterrent effect by 
threatening not only an international prosecution, but also 
domestic prosecutions.98 
The evidence shows that the ICC is employing its powers to 
encourage states to investigate and prosecute covered crimes 
domestically.  The OTP is using its powers to conduct 
preliminary examinations of situations that may give rise to a 
formal ICC investigation in the event that jurisdictional 
prerequisites are satisfied—including the absence of genuine 
national proceedings.99  According to a Policy Paper issued by the 
OTP, the goals of the office’s preliminary investigation activities 
include (1) ending impunity, by encouraging genuine national 
proceedings and (2) the prevention of crimes.100  The OTP 
employs different tools and strategies to encourage genuine 
national proceedings through its preliminary examinations, 
including sending in-country missions and holding consultations 
with national authorities and NGOs.101  As to the “prevention” 
function, the OTP notes that during preliminary examinations, 
the office often issues public statements that serve to warn 
perpetrators of the ICC’s interest and the potential for 
international or domestic prosecutions should perpetrators not 
cease committing crimes.102  Between 2004 and 2015, the OTP 
has commenced a total of twenty-three preliminary 
examinations: nine were ongoing as of January 2016, nine led to 
a decision to proceed, and five led to a decision not to proceed.103   
98 Id. 
99 See ICC OTP, POLICY PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 8–17 (Nov. 
2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy_Paper_Preliminary_Examin 
ations_2013-ENG.pdf (describing in detail the statutory factors that must be 
satisfied to commence a formal investigation). 
100 Id. at 4. 
101 Id. at 24. The OTP has referred to this process of encouraging national 
prosecutions as its “positive approach to complementarity.” ICC OTP, 
PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 2009-2012 5 (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/ 
rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorial 
Strategy20092013.pdf. 
102 ICC OTP, POLICY PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS, supra note 99, at 
24–25 (referencing public statements made in connection with various preliminary 
examinations). 
103 ICC ASP, REPORT OF THE COURT ON THE BASIC SIZE OF THE OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR 28 ICC-ASP/14/21 (Sept. 17, 2015), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_ 
docs/ASP14/ICC-ASP-14-21-ENG.pdf. 
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The countries where preliminary examinations were ongoing 
included Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea, Iraq, Nigeria, 
Palestine, and Ukraine.104 
Further, some evidence shows that the ICC’s preliminary 
examinations do produce some of the hoped-for 
“complementarity” effects.  For example, the OTP began a 
preliminary examination in Colombia in June 2004.105  The 
examination reportedly put pressure on the Colombian courts 
and prosecutors to pursue accountability for mass atrocities and 
other human rights abuses.106  Anecdotal evidence also indicates 
that the preliminary examination put pressure on state and non-
state actors to conform their behavior so they could avoid being 
prosecuted by the ICC.107  According to a cable published by 
Wikileaks, former president Pastrana “voiced concern that the 
[ICC] could attempt to prosecute him for allegedly creating a 
safehaven for narcoterrorists through the Caguan process.”108  
The preliminary examination apparently played a role in 
104 See Preliminary Examinations, ICC https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Prelimi 
nary-Examinations.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2017). 
105 ICC OTP, SITUATION IN COLOMBIA: INTERIM REPORT 2 (Nov. 2012), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3D3055BD-16E2-4C83-BA85-35BCFD2A7922 
/285102/OTPCOLOMBIAPublicInterimReportNovember2012.pdf.  
106 See, e.g., Amanda Lyons & Michael Reed-Hurtado, The Rome Statute Review 
Conf., Colombia: Impact of the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court, 
INT'L. CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. 4 (May 2010), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/f 
iles/ICTJ-Colombia-Impact-ICC-2010-English.pdf. (noting that visits and statements 
of the ICC prosecutor put pressure on judges and prosecutors); Kirsten Ainley, The 
Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court: Counteracting the 
Crisis, 91 INT’L AFFS. 37, 48–49 (2015) (suggesting that the ICC’s threat of 
prosecution produced positive impact in Colombia in terms of improving domestic 
protections against impunity for mass atrocities and other human rights abuses). 
107 Nick Grono, The Deterrent Effect of the ICC on the Commission of 
International Crimes by Government Leaders, CRISIS GROUP (Oct. 6, 2012), 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/deterrent-effect-icc-commission-international-
crimes-government-leaders.  
108 Ambassador’s November 1 Meeting with Former President Andres Pastrana, 
WIKILEAKS (Nov. 14, 2007), https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BOGOTA 
8045_a.html. To the extent Pastrana was referencing peace talks in Caguan in the 
late 1990s, he may be incorrect in surmising that the ICC would have jurisdiction 
over any encompassed crimes. See Darynell Rodriguez Torres, Colombia’s Peace 
Process: Three Challenges, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Oct. 15, 2012), https://www.opend 
emocracy.net/opensecurity/darynell-rodriguez-torres/colombias-peace-process-three-
challenges. Colombia did not join the ICC until 2002 after those talks had ended, 
and it also included a reservation exempting Colombia from the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over war crimes. See Colombia’s ICC Declaration a “Prelude to Impunity,” HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 5, 2002), https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/09/05/colombias-icc-
declaration-prelude-impunity. 
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prompting Colombia to pass its 2005 Peace and Justice Law.109  
The Colombian government itself has claimed that as a result of 
the ICC’s preliminary examination (1) some 18,000 weapons have 
been surrendered and destroyed; (2) the main leaders of rebel 
groups are behind bars awaiting trials; (3) more than 280,000 
people have been registered as victims; and (4) the country has 
investigated more than 36,000 previously unknown criminal 
actions.110 
In addition, the OTP’s assessment of the facts on the ground 
is positive as to the “complementarity” effect in Colombia.  In 
2009, then-ICC Prosecutor Ocampo stated that “I can say the 
system is working.  They, in their domestic law, have cases 
against paramilitaries, guerrillas and even against their own 
military, so much so that other states have opted to use Colombia 
as an example to do the same.  That’s why we do not have to 
intervene.”111  Prosecutor Bensouda has similarly concluded that 
the facts in Colombia demonstrate a positive complementarity 
effect.  She stated that “the prospect of the ICC attaining 
jurisdiction was mentioned by prosecutors, courts, legislators and 
members of the Executive Branch as a reason to make policy 
choices in implementing the Justice and Peace Law, thus 
ensuring that the main perpetrators of crimes would be 
prosecuted.”112 
In other words, what counts towards the ICC’s deterrence 
message about the certainty of prosecution is not only the cases 
commenced by the ICC.  That message is supplemented by the 
ICC’s ability to coerce states to institute domestic proceedings so 
109 Grono, supra note 107; see also Lyons & Reed-Hurtado, supra note 106, at 5 
(quoting the High Commissioner for Peace who said, “The government has proposed 
a draft law that will block the action of the International Criminal Court”); Luis 
Carlos Restrepo, Revelaciones Explosivas, SEMANA (Sept. 24, 2004), 
http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/revelaciones-explosivas/68391-3 (quoting the 
High Commissioner for Peace in Spanish: “Esta no es un peligro. El gobierno ofreció 
un proyecto de ley que bloquea la acción de la Corte Penal Internacional”). 
110 Ainley, supra note 106, at 48 n.47. 
111 Bryon Wells, Colombian Judicial System Works: ICC Official, COLUMBIA 
REPORTS (Dec. 9, 2009), http://colombiareports.com/colombian-judicial-system-is-
working-properly-foreign-observer-says/. 
112 Fatou Bensouda, Deputy Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Keynote 
Address at the Africa Legal Aid, Commonwealth Secretariat, and International 
Legal Assistance Consortium: The International Criminal Court in a Politically 
Divided World (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.internationallawbureau.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/here1.pdf. 
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they can avoid having their citizens prosecuted in The Hague. 
Ratification of the Rome Statute not only increases the possibility 
of international prosecution, but also the possibility of domestic 
prosecution. 
Based on all of the above, we suggest that the ICC can 
effectively deter at least some actors some of the time.  By joining 
the ICC, states have necessarily increased the threat of an ICC 
prosecution.  Because of the ICC’s complementarity provision, 
states also increase the threat that their citizens will be 
prosecuted domestically.  Because joining the ICC raises the cost 
side of the cost-benefit equation, individuals should generally be 
less likely than before to commit acts that can constitute crimes 
within the ICC’s jurisdiction.  In addition, state leaders should 
value state sovereignty and generally want to avoid having their 
citizens prosecuted.  They should want to discourage individuals 
from committing acts that can constitute any of the ICC core 
crimes and also ensure that the state’s laws and institutions will 
permit the state to prosecute its citizens domestically should they 
commit any of the ICC crimes.113 
Although there is scant empirical literature examining the 
question of whether the ICC deters, the few studies to date 
support our conclusion that the ICC can sometimes produce a 
deterrent effect.  For example, Akhavan examined documentary 
evidence from Uganda and Ivory Coast and concluded that (1) the 
ICC led to a decrease in violence in Uganda and compelled 
Joseph Kony to negotiate and that (2)  the mere threat of an ICC 
prosecution contributed to diffusing a volatile situation in Ivory 
Coast.114  Nouwen conducted a qualitative study examining the 
effect of the ICC’s complementarity provision in Uganda and 
113 Some states have self-referred matters to the ICC for prosecution—behavior 
which could indicate that states do not want to guard their sovereignty and ward 
against an ICC intervention. In those self-referrals, however, the OTP has only 
targeted non-state actors—not the governments against whom those non-state 
actors were fighting when they committed their crimes. KERSTEN, supra note 67, at 
164–65. Thus, as some commentators note, governments might at times “use” the 
court. Id. at 167. Recent comments by President Museveni, the person who gave the 
ICC its first case, support such a conclusion. Museveni has called on all African 
states to quit the court, charging the court with being anti-African and challenging 
its decision to charge African leaders with crimes. See Wang Ntui Belle, African 
Countries to Quit the International Criminal Court, THE AFRICAN EXPONENT (Oct. 
18, 2016), https://www.africanexponent.com/post/8063-african-countries-to-quit-the-
international-criminal-court. 
114 Akhavan, Reconciling, supra note 47, at 640, 640–43. 
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Sudan, looking for evidence of whether the ICC’s intervention 
had encouraged domestic prosecutions of conflict-related crimes 
and reform of criminal justice systems.  Based on documentary 
and interview evidence of high-level subjects, she found some law 
reform.  On the other hand, she found little evidence of an 
increase in prosecutions.115  In a large-N statistical study on the 
ICC’s deterrent effect, Jo and Simmons found that ICC 
ratification, as well as an increase in ICC investigations over 
time, was associated with a reduction in intentional civilian 
killings, a finding they attribute to both the legal deterrent effect 
from the possibility of punishment and a complementary social 
deterrent effect.116 
The documentary and interview evidence we gathered 
during this Kenya case study will contribute to this scant 
literature that empirically examines the ICC’s deterrent effect. 
Through this evidence, however, we also make an important 
theoretical contribution to the literature debating the deterrent 
effect of international criminal justice.  We illustrate the need to 
“unpack” the ICC’s deterrent effect and thereby establish a new 
model for evaluating and understanding the circumstances under 
which deterrence is more or less likely to occur. 
B. Nuancing the ICC’s Deterrent Effect
While the ICC is generally designed to deter, we do not
expect that it can necessarily deter all actors in all situations all 
the time.  We suggest that several factors will influence the ICC’s 
ability to deter: (1) the domestic political context, (2) the type of 
actor the ICC is targeting, and (3) the level of the ICC’s 
intervention. 
First, as to the domestic political context, we distinguish 
between democracies and non-democracies—or unconsolidated 
democracies.  For the most part, democracies generally have good 
human rights practices and should not expect their citizens to 
commit the kinds of acts that would subject them to an ICC 
115 See SARAH M. H. NOUWEN, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE 
CATALYSING EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND 
SUDAN 337 (2013). 
116 Jo & Simmons, supra note 38, at 460–66 (conducting what appears to be the 
most sophisticated large-N statistical study to date on the question of the ICC’s 
deterrent effect). 
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prosecution.117  Democracies also tend to have developed 
independent law enforcement institutions that should enable 
them to prosecute any such abuses in domestic courts.118 We 
expect that state and non-state actors in democracies will 
consider the ICC’s threat of prosecution as a cost to be calculated. 
However, such states may view the threat of an ICC prosecution 
as miniscule because the state will prosecute citizens in its 
domestic courts should citizens commit abuses.119 In terms of a 
visible ICC deterrent effect, one may not see an improvement in 
human rights practices, since states with good practices do not 
expect their citizens to commit mass atrocities or other human 
rights abuses.120  The ICC could still produce a legal deterrent 
effect on democracies.  For example, joining the ICC could cause 
these states to implement the ICC crimes into domestic 
legislation so that the state has greater assurances that it can 
prosecute such crimes domestically.121 
117 See Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 
1839–40, 1840 n.60 (2003) (stating and showing that democracies tend to have better 
human rights practices than non-democracies). 
118 See, e.g., Wade M. Cole, Sovereignty Relinquished? Explaining Commitment 
to the International Human Rights Covenants, 1966-1999, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 472, 
475–76 (2005) (explaining that democratic states generally protect basic human 
rights, apply the rule of law fairly, and limit state power whereas non-democracies 
tend not to place legal constraints on their power). 
119 See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 81 (arguing that democracies with good human 
rights practices will be the type of state most likely to join the ICC because 
compliance costs are minimal in that they should not expect their citizens to commit 
mass atrocities); Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the 
International Criminal Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 231 (2010) (hypothesizing in their 
article examining state commitment to the ICC that states with good practices and 
strong institutions of domestic accountability are less likely to view ICC 
commitment as costly). 
120 Simmons and Danner make the point in their article examining commitment 
to the ICC that one reason “peaceful” states like those in Scandinavia may have 
joined the court is because they would not expect their nationals would ever be 
subjected to its jurisdiction. Simmons & Danner, supra note 119, at 231. 
121 For example, Germany implemented the ICC crimes into its domestic 
legislation in 2002 before joining the ICC. See Andreas Zimmermann, Main Features 
of the New German Code of Crimes against International Law 
(Völkerstrafgesetzbuch), in NATIONAL LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES: APPROACHES OF CIVIL AND COMMON LAW COUNTRIES 138–39 (Matthias 
Neuner ed., 2003). 
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Non-democracies and unconsolidated democracies122 differ in 
important respects from democracies—in respects that also affect 
our calculus regarding the ICC’s potential deterrent effect.  In 
both, the executive is not fully independent from other branches 
of government and does not fully respect the rule of law.123  
Therefore, we also expect that these states will have poorer 
human rights practices, weaker domestic legal institutions than 
democracies, or both.124  Because they may be more likely targets 
of an ICC investigation, non-democracies and unconsolidated 
democracies may also be less likely to join the ICC than states 
with better practices and policies.125  To the extent that states 
with these weaker characteristics do join the court, to avoid the 
threat of an ICC prosecution and the accompanying loss of 
sovereignty, they will have to either ensure that their citizens do 
not commit crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction or ensure that 
they have the level of domestic law enforcement institutions to 
enable a domestic prosecution of such crimes should they occur. 
We expect the evidence of deterrence among member states that 
joined with weaker policies and practices to be greater because 
the risk of a prosecution is also greatest in these states. 
The second factor identified above—the target of the ICC’s 
investigation—is also relevant to the deterrence calculus.  We 
suggest that the ICC may produce an unintended or perverse 
effect if it focuses its attention on leaders of non-democracies or 
122 “Unconsolidated democracies” are those states that have not fully 
transitioned to a democracy. They are states that do not fully respect the rule of law 
and where the executive is not fully independent from other branches of 
government. See JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-
COMMUNIST EUROPE 3 (1996) (“A democratic transition is complete when sufficient 
agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected 
government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free 
and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new 
policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new 
democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure.”). 
123 See id. 
124 See Hathaway, supra note 117, at 1839–40, 1840 n.60 (stating and showing 
that democracies tend to have better human rights practices than non-democracies). 
125  See DUTTON, supra note 81 (finding from quantitative and qualitative 
analysis that states with poorer human rights practices and weaker domestic law 
enforcement institutions were less likely to join the ICC than states with good 
practices and policies).  
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unconsolidated democracies.126  In this political context, where a 
potential ICC intervention threatens a hold on power or push to 
gain power, state actors may respond by committing human 
rights abuses that specifically aid them in holding on to or 
gaining power.  This hypothesis is based on our assessment that 
state leaders in such a situation may rationally view the benefits 
of power as being exceptionally high and the risks of prosecution 
as exceptionally low.  As to benefits, state leaders in non-
democracies or unconsolidated democracies do not have only 
political “power” per se, but they also frequently have exceptional 
access to state resources that they can siphon off to themselves or 
their cohorts.127  As to costs, domestically these actors may face 
little risk of prosecution for any crimes they commit since 
domestic law enforcement mechanisms often do not function 
fairly and independently from government.128  Furthermore, they 
wield power over the citizenry and control government resources, 
including the resources that could be used to punish themselves 
126 We group non-democracies and unconsolidated democracies together because 
both share features important to our hypothesis regarding leader control over 
government resources. As O’Donnell notes, while many countries have in theory rid 
themselves of authoritarian regimes, even when they hold elections, their brand of 
government still may resemble an autocracy more than an established democracy. 
Guillermo O’Donnell, Illusions About Consolidation, 7 J. DEMOC. 34, 34 (1996). 
Thus, even if a state holds free elections but fails to consolidate and institutionalize 
checks and balances on executive power and respect for the rule of law, we do not 
consider it an established or consolidated democracy. 
127 See, e.g., Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Controlling Corruption Through Collective 
Action, 24 J. DEMOC. 101, 101 (2013) (stating that while the “most egregious 
examples of ‘state capture’ are found in autocracies,” new democracies increasingly 
are producing a regime where rulers monopolize power and treat the state as their 
own, practicing “a similarly nonuniversal allocation of public resources based on 
patronage, nepotism, and the exchange of favors”); Douglas Marcouiller & Leslie 
Young, The Black Hole of Graft: The Predatory State and the Informal Economy, 85 
AM. ECON. REV. 630, 630 (1995) (“[I]n states with inadequate democratic checks and 
balances, the apparatus of orderly government is all too often hijacked by a 
predatory oligarchy who siphon the national treasury and transform government 
bureaus into bribe-collection agencies which impede legitimate business.”); Gary 
Milante, A Kleptocrat’s Survival Guide: Autocratic Longevity in the Face of Civil 
Conflict 2 (World Bank, Washington D.C., Policy Research Working Paper No. 4186, 
2007) (referencing the kleptocratic tendencies of authoritarian regimes whereby 
political elites use state resources to reward their client and patron networks, as 
opposed to the populace more generally). 
128 See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 117, at 1838–39 (explaining that non-
democracies tend to have few internal enforcement mechanisms to hold government 
accountable); id. at 1840 (stating that democracies are more likely than non-
democracies to exhibit a commitment to the rule of law). 
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for abuses.  These actors may also underestimate the threat of an 
ICC action because their positions give them an ability to 
“manipulate” the international justice system—one that relies 
heavily on state cooperation. 
In short, in some circumstances, we expect that the threat of 
an ICC prosecution will produce an unintended or perverse effect 
and cause some individuals targeted by the ICC to commit 
abuses.  We draw on the literature discussing the potential 
tradeoff between “justice” and “peace” to support this 
hypothesis.129  Our focus with this argument is on leaders in non-
democracies or unconsolidated democracies.  We argue that a 
threat that the ICC might interfere with a hold on power or effort 
to gain power may push such leaders “into a corner” and cause 
them to conclude that there is little reason to refrain from 
committing abuses that can aid them in their bid for power. 
Whether the ICC produces a deterrent or perverse effect on 
the leaders of non-democracies or unconsolidated democracies 
may depend on our third identified factor—the level of the ICC’s 
intervention.  A lower level of ICC intervention lowers the cost 
side of the equation, making it more likely that a rational actor 
will not be deterred from committing abuses.  As the ICC’s level 
of intervention increases, so too does the cost side of the 
equation, making it more likely that the ICC can produce a 
deterrent effect and by its threat dissuade individuals from 
committing crimes and persuade the government to institute 
measures of domestic accountability.  In such a case, the ICC has 
demonstrated its power to act.  While state leaders will still 
highly value retaining or gaining positions of power, committing 
obvious acts that can constitute any of the ICC core crimes could 
prove very costly since such moves could attract additional 
attention from the international community and the ICC.130  
129 See, e.g., Akhavan, Reconciling, supra note 47, at 625 (describing the “peace 
versus justice” dilemma: “whether, in certain circumstances, the prospect of 
prosecution creates a disincentive for implicated leaders to end war or surrender 
power”). 
130 For example, in the case of Libya, in 2011, Gaddafi’s obvious attacks on 
civilians, which included the government’s use of live fire on peaceful protestors, 
attracted the attention of the international community. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
WORLD REPORT 2012: LIBYA EVENTS OF 2011 2 (2012) (noting the international 
response to Gaddafi’s “crackdown” on peaceful anti-government protestors). In 
February 2011, the Security Council referred the Libya situation to the ICC, noting, 
among other things, the government’s widespread and systematic attacks against 
the civilian population. See S.C. Res. 1970 ¶¶ 4–6 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
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Nevertheless, a very high level of ICC intervention may cause 
suspects to believe they have no opportunity for escape.  When 
leaders feel especially threatened, they will have more reason to 
value gaining power or staying in power:  With power, they can 
manipulate state machinery so that abuses are not uncovered or 
punished at the domestic or international level.  If leaders put 
such a high value on power, they may also see little reason to 
refrain from committing crimes that will aid them in their quest 
to gain power or stay in power. 
Finally, although we do not disagree that social deterrence 
plays an important role in complementing legal deterrents, we do 
not envision a significant role for social deterrence as regards 
leaders in non-democracies or unconsolidated democracies.  We 
note this point specifically because Jo and Simmons’ recent 
quantitative study examining the ICC’s deterrent effect advanced 
an argument about social deterrence.  Those scholars argue that 
the ICC deters socially “because it mobilizes the international 
community as well as domestic civil society to demand justice.”131  
Their hypothesis is that state actors, as opposed to rebels, are 
those most likely to be influenced by complementary social 
sanctions.132  State actors should want to be viewed as legitimate 
by the domestic public or the international community—a 
community they may depend on for aid or trade.133  Since they 
want to be viewed as legitimate, these state actors are also more 
likely to be responsive to domestic and international pressures to 
cease committing international crimes.134 
While we do not disagree with Jo and Simmons that some 
state actors can be socially deterred, we again argue for more 
nuance and “unpacking.”  We expect that state actors who are in 
a position to manipulate the system will either not find such 
131 Jo & Simmons, supra note 38, at 469. 
132 Id. at 452–55. 
133 Id. at 452–70. 
134 Jo and Simmons tested their deterrence argument on a dependent variable 
measuring “the number of civilians killed intentionally by government forces or rebel 
groups in a direct military confrontation.” Id. at 456. The study produced evidence 
that state actors were legally and socially deterred. Id. at 469–70. In states that 
ratified the Rome Statute, a larger domestic presence of human rights organizations 
was associated with a decrease in intentional killings by government actors. Id. at 
463–64. At the international level of social sanctions, the results also showed that 
“governments that ratified the ICC Statute were subsequently much more likely to 
reduce or refrain from intentional civilian violence the more aid they received.” Id. at 
464–65. 
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pressures compelling or will be able to “hide under the radar” 
because they control the machinery that would expose their own 
abuses.  This is so even if the state has substantial international 
financial relationships and a domestic civil society pushing a 
“justice” agenda.  Indeed, for leaders in non-democracies and 
unconsolidated democracies, the benefit of holding on to power or 
obtaining power may be so great that it outweighs any potential 
costs related to legal or social shaming—even if that shaming 
might result in the country receiving less foreign aid. 
The table below sets out our expectations regarding the 
ICC’s likely deterrent effect taking into account various factors 
that we argue could make the ICC more or less likely to produce 
a deterrent effect. 
Table 1: ICC Deterrent Effect Expectations 
Low Level 
ICC 
Intervention 
(e.g., 
Ratification) 
Higher Level 
ICC 
Intervention 
(e.g., 
Preliminary 
Examination) 
Highest Level 
of ICC 
Intervention 
(e.g., 
Prosecution 
of State 
Leaders) 
Democracy State ensures it 
has good 
human rights 
practices and 
institutions to 
punish 
violations 
domestically 
State ensures it 
has good human 
rights practices 
and institutions 
to punish 
violations 
domestically 
State ensures it 
has good 
human rights 
practices and 
institutions to 
punish 
violations 
domestically 
Non-
Democracy 
or 
Unconsolid-
ated 
Democracy 
No significant 
deterrent effect 
because threat 
of prosecution 
seems low 
More significant 
deterrent effect 
because threat of 
prosecution has 
become more 
real/but also risk 
of perverse effect 
if investigations 
focus on state 
leaders who may 
commit human 
rights abuses to 
gain or maintain 
More 
significant 
deterrent effect 
because threat 
of prosecution 
is very real/but 
also risk of 
perverse effect 
if prosecution 
focuses on state 
leaders who 
control state 
machinery that 
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power could be used to 
commit human 
rights abuses to 
maintain power 
and avoid ICC 
prosecution 
III. THE KENYA CASE STUDY: METHODOLOGY AND SELECTION
A. Methodology
We test our hypotheses about the various factors that may
make the ICC more or less likely to produce a deterrent effect 
using a case study of Kenya and its relationship with the ICC 
over time.  We also use this opportunity to test the social 
deterrence theory advanced by Jo and Simmons.  The Kenya case 
study, like all case studies, enables the researcher to produce 
context-dependent knowledge and experience to lead to a deeper 
understanding of the subject matter being studied.135  Through 
this case study, we trace the behavior of Kenya and particular 
individuals within the state relevant to whether and under what 
circumstances the ICC’s intervention has produced a positive or 
negative deterrent effect. 
Our study draws on documentary evidence obtained from 
government, NGO, news, and scholarly sources, among others. 
Unique to this case study of Kenya is that it also draws on novel 
data collected during semi-structured interviews conducted in 
Nairobi, Kenya during July, August and October 2015 with 
various high-level subjects, including former government 
officials, media persons, academics, and leaders in civil society, 
and think-tanks.  A local civil society organization with extensive 
experience working on peace and conflict transformation in 
Kenya, NPI-Africa,136 facilitated the interviews and helped us 
identify individuals who would have significant knowledge about 
(1) Kenya’s history as it relates to human rights abuses and
impunity; (2) the 2007 post-election violence; (3) Kenya’s
interaction with the ICC over time; (4) the facts surrounding
135 See BENT FLYVBJERG, FIVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT CASE STUDY 
RESEARCH, in QUALITATIVE RESEARCH PRACTICE 391–92 (Clive Seale, Giampietro 
Gobo, Jaber F. Gubrium, & David Silverman, eds., 2d ed. 2004). 
136 For more information, see NPI-AFRICA, http://www.npi-africa.org (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2017). 
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Kenya’s 2013 election campaign; and (5) the individuals who 
were named ICC suspects.  We did not confine our selection of 
interviewees to any one specific political or ethnic affiliation. 
Our interviewees varied as to their political and ethnic 
allegiances.  As such, this study benefits from the unique insights 
of Kenyans with on-the-ground knowledge and the ability to 
observe events from within a cultural milieu unfamiliar to 
foreigners. 
We conducted a total of 25 such high-level interviews—18 
representatives from civil society and think tanks, 2 from the 
media, 2 former politicians and 3 from academia—while on 
location in Kenya.  Each interview lasted between one and four 
hours.  Because of the sensitivity of the topics addressed during 
the interviews, we promised to protect the confidentiality of the 
interviewees’ information by not linking it to any specific person 
in any reports or publications.  Also to protect confidentiality and 
enable interviewees to speak freely, we agreed to meet 
interviewees in the location of their choice.  To conduct the 
interviews, we used an interview guide with prepared questions, 
but the interviews were semi-structured so as to allow the 
interviewees to narrate without being too constrained.137 
As noted, isolating cause is a difficult task, made more 
difficult by the presence of other factors that could also have 
influenced particular behavioral change.  Nevertheless, our 
interviews show how informed actors on the ground perceive the 
ICC’s deterrent effect under varying circumstances and over 
time.  Combined with documentary data about what happened in  
Kenya before and after it ratified the Rome Statute, the result is 
a new model for evaluating and understanding the ICC’s 
deterrent power. 
B. Case Selection
We chose Kenya to test our hypotheses and from which to
seek evidence of the ICC’s deterrent effect—and any unintended 
or perverse effect—for several reasons.  First, the country joined 
137 We provided all interviewees with an informed consent statement before 
interviewing them that advised them, among other things, that participation in the 
interview was voluntary and that they could terminate their participation, or refuse 
to answer questions, at any time. The informed consent statement also advised 
interviewees that we would keep their identity confidential and not refer to them by 
name in any report or publication. 
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the ICC in 2005 despite a history of poor human rights 
practices,138 as well as weak and corrupt domestic legal 
institutions.139  In fact, Jomo Kenyatta, the country’s first 
president after independence, and Daniel arap Moi, who ruled 
the country for 24 years after Kenyatta’s death in 1978, have 
both been accused of using state resources to favor their own 
people and marginalize other ethnic groups.  Both have also been 
accused of committing human rights abuses to aid them in 
maintaining power with impunity.140  Abuses by those in power 
continued after the country introduced multi-party elections in 
1991;141 leaders instrumentally incited violence between ethnic  
groups142 in their quest for power.143  Moi provoked ethnic 
violence in order to influence voting patterns so that he could win 
138 See, e.g., Stephen Brown & Chandra Lekha Sriram, The Big Fish Won’t Fry 
Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya, 111 AFR. 
AFFS. 244, 247–49 (2012) (describing Kenya’s outbreaks of election-related violence 
since 1991 when the country began permitting multi-party elections and the absence 
of government prosecutions to hold any high-level perpetrators of the ethnic/political 
violence accountable); Susanne D. Mueller, The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis, 
2 J. E. AFR. STUD. 185, 187–93 (2008) (describing how Kenyan politicians have 
employed violence to aid them in obtaining power and repressing opposition politics). 
139 See Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/2/Add.6 (May 26, 
2009). 
140 See, e.g., Marcel Rutten & Sam Owuor, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Land, 
Ethnicity and the 2007 Elections in Kenya, 27 J. CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 305, 313 
(2009) (noting that several influential politicians were detained or killed during 
Kenyatta’s administration); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KENYA’S UNFINISHED 
DEMOCRACY: A HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT 1–4, 7–8 (2002) 
(stating that Moi’s 24 years as Kenya’s autocratic leader were characterized by 
endemic corruption, human rights abuses, and excessive use of force by the state) 
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KENYA’S UNFINISHED DEMOCRACY]. 
141 Forced by domestic and international pressures, in 1991, Moi finally repealed 
a controversial clause of the constitution that made his party, KANU (the Kenyan 
African National Union), the sole political party by law. See Susanne D. Mueller, 
Dying To Win: Elections, Political Violence, and Institutional Decay in Kenya, 29 J. 
CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 99, 103 (2011) (noting that Moi decided to accept a multiparty 
system after international financial and local pressures) [hereinafter Mueller, Dying 
to Win]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DIVIDE AND RULE: STATE-SPONSORED ETHNIC 
VIOLENCE IN KENYA 9 (1993) (explaining that civil society organizations demanded 
the end of a one-party state which in turn prompted international donors to suspend 
foreign aid) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DIVIDE AND RULE].  
142 Kenya has over forty different ethnic groups. The three largest are the 
Kikuyu (20%), the Luhya (14%), and Luo (13%). Smaller groups include Kalenjin 
(11%), Kamba (11%), Kisii (6%) and the Meru (5.5%). See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
KENYA’S UNFINISHED DEMOCRACY, supra note 140, at 5; see also The Crisis in 
Kenya, INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
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the presidency in both 1992 and 1997.144  The 1992 violence 
resulted in the deaths of some 1,500 people and the displacement 
of more than 300,000.145  The 1997 violence resulted in between 
70 and 100 people dead and about 200,000 displaced.146 
The historical record also shows that after election violence 
damps down in Kenya, impunity is the order of the day.  After 
the 1992 violence, and in response to calls for investigations from 
opposition and church groups, Moi authorized a parliamentary 
committee to investigate.  Although the committee concluded 
that politicians associated with Moi were responsible for 
organizing and funding the violence, no one was ever held 
accountable.147  After the 1997 violence, Moi again established a 
committee.  He tasked the Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry to 
investigate “tribal clashes” that have occurred since 1991, the 
origins and underlying causes of the clashes, responses of the 
police and other law enforcement agencies to these incidents, and 
the “level of preparedness and the effectiveness of law 
enforcement agencies” in controlling and preventing such 
clashes.148  That Commission issued a report in 1999, but because 
the government objected, the report was not made public until 
2002.  The Akiwumi Commission concluded that members of 
Moi’s ruling party had incited violence and later frustrated 
investigations.149  As before, however, the government did not 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-kenya#1 (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2017).,  
143 See Sabine Höhn, New Start or False Start? The ICC and Electoral Violence 
in Kenya, 45 DEV. AND CHANGE 565, 568 (2014) (noting that election periods became 
more violent after political liberalization and the introduction of multiparty system); 
see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DIVIDE AND RULE, supra note 141, at 1; Lawrence 
Gitonga Mwongera, Making Sense of Political-Related Violence in Kenya, OPEN 
SECURITY (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/lawrence-
gitonga-mwongera/making-sense-of-political-related-violence-in-kenya. 
144 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KENYA’S UNFINISHED DEMOCRACY, supra note 140, 
at 5–6; Mwongera, supra note 143. 
145 See Höhn, supra note 143, at 568; Brown & Sriram, supra note 138, at 247. 
146 See Höhn, supra note 143, at 568. 
147 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PLAYING THE “COMMUNAL CARD”: COMMUNAL 
VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 106 (1995) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
COMMUNAL CARD]. 
148 JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO TRIBAL CLASHES IN KENYA, REPORT 
OF THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO TRIBAL CLASHES IN 
KENYA iii (2002), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Akiwumi 
%20Report.pdf. 
149 See id. 
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hold any perpetrators accountable for their roles in the 
violence.150 
It is true that the 2002 elections that led to Mwai Kibaki 
assuming the presidency were not accompanied by any 
significant violence.151  The promised democratic reforms, 
however, did not materialize despite Kibaki’s campaign promises. 
Human Rights Watch states that few reforms had been 
implemented as of 2008.152  A 2009 Human Rights Council Report 
characterized Kenya’s judicial system as “slow and corrupt.”153  In 
fact, the evidence suggests that democracy in Kenya was not 
consolidated by the time of the 2007 post-election violence. 
Mueller argues that one of the root causes of that violence was 
that Kenya remained characterized by “deliberately weak 
institutions, mostly overridden by a highly personalized and 
centralized presidency, that could and did not exercise the 
autonomy or checks and balances normally associated with 
democracies. . . .”154 
For all of these reasons, Kenya is a country that could 
improve its human rights practices and protections against such 
abuses at the time it joined the ICC and thereafter.  By joining 
the court, Kenya committed itself to address mass atrocities and 
increased the possibility that its citizens would be subjected to an 
ICC prosecution and increased a risk to its sovereignty—risking 
that its citizens would be prosecuted in The Hague should they 
commit mass atrocities or should Kenya fail to prosecute 
perpetrators on its own.  To avoid this fate, Kenya could improve 
(1) behaviors and practices related to the incidence of mass
atrocities or other human rights abuses and (2) its institutional
150 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 16, at 18–19. 
151 One reason for the absence of significant ethnic tensions during the 2002 
elections is that both presidential candidates were from the Kikuyu community. 
Stefan Dercon & Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero, Triggers and Characteristics of the 2007 
Kenyan Electoral Violence, 40 WORLD DEV. 731, 733 (2012). 
152 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 16, at 12. 
153 See Alston, supra note 139, ¶ 23, 16–17. 
154 Mueller, Dying to Win, supra note 141, at 186. Data from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators Database shows that Kenya has had low rule of law and 
control of corruption scores relative to other countries in the world between 1996 
and 2013. Rule of law scores hover in the 20th to 30th percentile rank. Control of 
corruption scores hover within the 10th and 20th percentile rank. See Worldwide 
Governance Indicators: Country Data Report for Kenya 1996-2013, THE WORLD 
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2017). 
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mechanisms to enable it to respond to such crimes should they 
occur.  Countries with already good practices and institutions 
offer less of an opportunity to find evidence of the ICC’s deterrent 
effect because those countries have less room for improvement 
and less of a reason to fear that their citizens might become the 
subject of an ICC prosecution. 
Second, because the named suspects in the Kenya cases 
included state actors—including Uhuru Kenyatta, the country’s 
sitting president as of March 2013—this case study provides an  
opportunity to seek out and analyze evidence of how those in 
power or those seeking a hold in power respond to an ICC 
intervention. 
Finally, Kenya is one of only a handful of countries where 
the ICC has specifically intervened by way of a formal ICC 
investigation and prosecution.155  This is the ICC’s highest level 
of intervention—higher than the preliminary examination phase 
that precedes it.  According to the OTP, it conducts a 
“preliminary examination” of all situations that come to its 
attention to “decide whether there is a reasonable basis to 
initiate an investigation.”156  With Kenya, however, the OTP 
eventually opened a formal investigation, which meant that it 
had to convince the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber that there was a 
reasonable basis to initiate a formal investigation.157  That the 
ICC has intervened in Kenya with an investigation and 
prosecution of suspects suggests that there should be more 
available evidence to aid in making inferences about whether and 
under what circumstances the ICC is more or less likely to 
produce a deterrent effect. 
155 See Situations Under Investigation, supra note 87, for a list of the 9 different 
situations in which the ICC has commenced investigations and prosecutions. 
156 The legal criteria the OTP assesses during the preliminary examination 
phase include (1) if the crimes were committed after the Rome Statute came into 
effect, (2) if the crimes took place on the territory of a State Party or were committed 
by nationals of a State Party; (3) whether the crimes committed constitute war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide; (4) the gravity of these crimes; 
(5) whether the State Party has commenced any genuine investigations and
prosecutions of the same crimes domestically; and (6) whether opening an ICC
investigation would serve the interests of justice and of the victims. See Office of the
Prosecutor, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp?ln=
en (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).
157 See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ¶¶ 17–69 (Mar. 31, 2010). 
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IV. UNPACKING THE ICC’S DETERRENT EFFECT
This section examines documentary and interview evidence 
in an effort to unpack the ICC’s deterrent effect for evidence of 
whether and in what circumstances the court is more or less 
likely to deter.  The specific objectives are to determine (1) 
whether the ICC has led to a reduction of mass atrocities or other 
human rights abuses and (2) whether the ICC has led to an 
increase in domestic protections available to punish those who 
commit such crimes.  Our analysis proceeds chronologically so as 
to map the behavior of state actors, in particular those targeted 
by the ICC over time and in relation to the level of the ICC’s 
intervention in the country.  By proceeding chronologically, we 
can take note of significant events occurring in Kenya relative to 
mass atrocities, human rights abuses, and domestic law 
enforcement mechanisms to punish such abuses.  We can also 
take note of the level of the ICC’s intervention, which we argue is 
related to assessing the cost side of the rational cost-benefit 
calculation. 
The case study analysis is divided into several sections, each 
of which is characterized by a different level of ICC intervention. 
First, we focus on the period of time when the ICC intervention 
consists solely of Kenya’s ratification.158  That period runs from 
when Kenya ratified the Rome Statute in 2005 up to the 2007 
post-election violence.  The second time period represents an 
increase in the ICC’s level of intervention, when it is conducting 
a preliminary examination and considering charges.  That time 
period runs from the immediate aftermath of the 2007 post-
election violence until March 2010 when an ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber authorized the prosecutor to commence a formal 
investigation into the Kenyan situation.  The third period of time 
corresponds with the ICC’s formal investigation and prosecution 
of the Kenyan suspects.  We chose December 2014 as the cut-off 
date for this period because by that time, the ICC prosecutor 
announced her decision to suspend the case against President 
Kenyatta.  Arguably after December 2014, the level of the ICC’s 
intervention was not as high—or perceived to be as high—as 
158 We characterize “ratification” as a level of intervention even though 
ratification does not involve specific oversight or action by the ICC’s OTP. In this 
case, the intervention exists because by joining, the state has legally committed to 
the court, thereby putting itself and its citizens at greater risk of an ICC prosecution 
than those of non-ratifying states. 
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when it was proceeding against six, or even four, suspects.  After 
all, the prosecutor’s stated reason for dropping the case against 
Kenyatta was because Kenya and its leaders had allegedly 
succeeded in obstructing the ICC’s ability to obtain evidence and 
convince witnesses to testify at trial. 
Finally, we briefly discuss a final time period: after 
December 2014 when the ICC proceeded only in its case against 
Deputy President, William Ruto, and radio journalist, Joshua 
Sang.  This discussion is brief because our data collection in 
Kenya ended in October 2015 when the case against the two 
defendants was still unfolding.  At that time, the facts on-the-
ground as between the ICC and Kenya were subject to change, 
making it exceptionally difficult to make any conclusive 
statement about deterrent effects or a lack thereof.  Further, our 
interviewees only shared information and opinions they formed 
on the basis of information available and known up to October 
2015. 
A. Ratification Until the 2007 Post-Election Violence
1. Assessing the ICC’s Legal Deterrent Effect in Kenya at the
Ratification Level of Intervention
Given Kenya’s history of poor human rights practices, elite-
driven election violence, and impunity, Kenya’s decision to join 
the ICC in 2005 is somewhat surprising.  After all, countries with 
such characteristics are most likely to face the risk that their 
citizens will be tried in The Hague.  To avoid such a fate, Kenya 
would have to make a break from its past and improve its 
practices and institutions so as to avoid such a sovereignty loss. 
The fact of Kenya’s ICC treaty ratification, however, does not 
seem to have produced such a deterrent effect: during this time 
period, the evidence does not show a (1) reduction in mass 
atrocities or other human rights abuses or (2) an increase in 
domestic protections available to hold perpetrators of such crimes 
accountable. 
First, the evidence does not indicate that ICC ratification 
influenced Kenya to reduce the incidence of mass atrocities or 
other human rights abuses.  Instead, it shows that only two years 
after ratification, the country was immersed in mass violence. 
Nor was this a different kind of mass violence than Kenya had 
previously experienced.  Once again, political elites incited the 
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violence and pitted different ethnicities against each other for the 
purposes of gaining or maintaining power. 
In particular, on the evening of December 30, 2007, the 
Electoral Commission of Kenya announced that Mwai Kibaki had 
won the presidency, a somewhat surprising result given that pre-
election polls had indicated his opponent, Raila Odinga, held a 
substantial lead.159  Kibaki hastily had himself sworn in as 
president, while Odinga urged his supporters to protest against a 
“stolen election.”160  Thereafter, Kenya rapidly plunged into inter-
ethnic violence.  Supporters of Odinga, predominantly Luo and 
Kalenjin, attacked Kibaki’s Kikuyu supporters.  The Kikuyu 
retaliated.  According to a report issued after the violence 
concluded, politicians and business people planned and 
orchestrated much of the violence by enlisting the support of 
criminal gangs, such as the Mungiki, to carry out attacks.161  The 
violence left at least 1,000 people dead and approximately 
500,000 displaced over a two-month period.162 
Nor does the evidence show that ICC ratification prompted 
Kenya to improve its domestic mechanisms available to punish 
those who commit such crimes.  First, Kenya did not implement 
the ICC crimes into its domestic legislation until January 2009, 
through the 2008 International Crimes Act.163  Second, during 
this time period, the government did not implement any 
significant democratic reforms that would further independent 
investigations and prosecutions of mass atrocities or other 
human rights abuses.  According to a Human Rights Watch 
Report, the Kibaki government’s one notable and positive step 
was establishing the Kenya National Commission on Human 
159 Höhn, supra note 143, at 567. 
160 See Jeffrey Steeves, Democracy Unravelled in Kenya: Multi-Party 
Competition and Ethnic Targeting, 9 AFR. IDENTITIES 455, 456 (2011); see also 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 16, at 21–23 (noting that 
international observer missions issued statements condemning the tallying results 
and casting doubt on the conclusion that Kibaki had won the election). 
161 See COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO POST ELECTION VIOLENCE, COMMISSION 
OF INQUIRY INTO THE POST ELECTION VIOLENCE (CIPEV) REPORT 347 (2008), 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/Commission_of_Inquiry_into_Post_Ele
ction_Violence.pdf [hereinafter Waki Commission Report]. 
162  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 16, at 21–23. 
163 Kenya began the process of adopting the Act in 2005, but it was only passed 
in 2009 after the ICC prosecutor threatened to launch his investigation. Antonina 
Okuta, National Legislation for Prosecution of International Crimes in Kenya, 7 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1063, 1065, 1072–73 (2009). 
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Rights (“KNCHR”) in 2003, a genuinely independent institution 
to act as a watchdog over the government.164  Notably, this was 
before Kenya ratified the ICC.  Otherwise, the report states that 
“[i]n general . . . promises of reform were not fulfilled.”165  Rather, 
the facts surrounding Kibaki’s proposed 2005 constitution show 
Kibaki’s lack of commitment to democratic reform.  Voters 
rejected the 2005 constitution, because it failed to release 
Kibaki’s stronghold on executive power.166  Afterwards, Kibaki 
demonstrated his dissatisfaction with the vote, and his intention 
to retain his stronghold on power, by dismissing his entire 
cabinet.167  He replaced the cabinet with individuals who were 
mostly “old friends and colleagues.”168 
In sum, the evidence indicates that ratification—the lowest 
level of ICC intervention—did not produce a deterrent effect in 
Kenya.  While we cannot know with absolute certainly why this 
is the case, the evidence shows that during this time, Kenyans 
greatly discounted the ICC’s threat, and the cost side of any 
rational cost-benefit calculation.169  Statements from interviewees 
support this interpretation.  Several interviewees, including 
former government advisors, said that at the time they ratified 
the Rome Statute, Kenya’s political leaders did not realize that 
they could be brought to The Hague.170  One interviewee 
indicated that Kenyans expected that the ICC “would just deal 
with the worst of the worst.  Many would not have viewed Kenya 
164 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 16, at 11–12. The 
KNCHR website contains additional information about the institution at KENYAN 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.knchr.org/Aboutus/Establ 
ishment.aspx/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2017). 
165 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 16, at 12. 
166 See Kenya: Country Report (2006), FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG, https://freedomho 
use.org/report/freedom-world/2006/kenya (last visited Aug. 8, 2017); see also 
MICHELA WRONG, IT’S OUR TURN TO EAT: THE STORY OF A KENYAN WHISTLE-
BLOWER 243 (2009). 
167 See, e.g., WRONG, supra note 166, at 243–44; Kenya’s Entire Cabinet 
Dismissed, BBC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2005, 6:34 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
4463262.stm. 
168 Defiant Kibaki Swears in Cabinet, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (Dec. 8, 2005), 
https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/defiant-kibaki-swears-cabinet. 
169 Susanne Mueller reaches a similar conclusion. She notes that when Kenya 
ratified the ICC treaty, the court was still in “its infancy.” Moreover, the political 
situation in Kenya seemed to be improving, such that many would have thought it 
inconceivable that any Kenyan would ever be charged by the ICC. Susanne D. 
Mueller, Kenya and the International Criminal Court: Politics, the Election, and the 
Law, 8 J. E. AFR. STUD. 25, 29 (2014) [hereinafter Mueller, Kenya and the ICC]. 
170 Interview with Subject 591, 898. 
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as a candidate for the court at the time as there were far worse 
things going on in other countries in Africa, and Kenya was at 
that time optimistic about its future and democracy.”171  An 
interviewee from civil society noted that by signing the Rome 
Statute Kenya would appear to be progressive.172  The 
interviewee added that signing certain treaties would not only 
suggest a strong human rights record in the country, but would 
also bring other benefits such as donor funding.173  Another 
interviewee stated: “Kenya is used to signing international 
agreements for prestige, rather than content.”174 
Evidence from parliamentary debates from 2001175 and 
2003176 supports this same conclusion:  The record indicates that 
Kenyan politicians were not terribly concerned with the risks of 
ratifying the Rome Statute.177  Parliamentary discussions in 2001 
focused on the issue of ratification and how Kenya might 
implement the Statute.  In fact, in response to the question 
whether “the Government fears that the ICC may try people 
amongst its ranks as it has done to Mr. Slobodan Milosevic and 
General Pinochet,” then-Attorney General, Amos Wako, indicated 
a lack of concern, stating that Kenya was committed to ratifying 
the Rome Statute.178  He elaborated by saying that “the 
government [of Kenya] has been one of the most active 
participants at the Preparatory Commission’s meetings in New 
York.”179  A review of the 2003 parliamentary debates show that 
Kenyan leaders were still intent on ratifying, but concerned 
171 Interview with Subject 333. 
172 Interview with Subject 582. 
173 Interview with Subject 582. 
174 Interview with Subject 444. 
175 National Assembly, KENYA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL RECORD 
(HANSARD), 3094 (Nov. 14, 2001) (indicating that the Kenyan government is 
committed to ratifying the Rome Statute and stressed that Kenya took an active 
part during the Rome Conference). 
176 National Assembly, KENYA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL RECORD 
(HANSARD), 2674 (Oct. 1, 2003) (discussing a request from the U.S. government to 
sign a bilateral agreement addressing the exclusion of arrest and hand-over of U.S. 
nationals to the ICC). 
177 See also Mueller, Kenya and the ICC, supra note 169, at 29 (stating that “[i]n 
the parliamentary debates of the time and among civil society activists, one finds no 
concern that any Kenyans would ever be hauled before the ICC,” the focus instead 
being on, among other things, “reconciling the parts of the Kenyan constitution that 
gave immunity to the president”). 
178 National Assembly, supra note 175, at 3094. 
179 Id. 
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about how to deal with the request from the United States to sign 
a bilateral immunity agreement promising not to surrender U.S. 
personnel to the ICC.180 
These views indicating that Kenya did not believe the ICC 
posed a great threat at the time make sense when one considers 
the context.  Recall that the ICC was a new institution that had 
been operating for only a few years when Kenya ratified the 
Rome Statute.  Further, in those years the prosecutor had relied 
on self-referrals, except for the Security Council’s referral of the 
situation in Darfur, Sudan.181  Moreover, those cases involved 
collapsed or transitioning states in the midst of raging civil 
wars.182  Finally, Kenya’s history as a non-democracy with a 
culture of impunity also likely figured as part of the calculus in 
assessing the ICC’s threat—and the cost side of the rational cost-
benefit calculation.  As described above, leaders in Kenya were 
used to “getting away” with their crimes:  They had not faced, 
and did not expect to face, judicial sanctions.  Individuals we 
interviewed made similar points.  For example, one interviewee 
said:  “Moi was an awful president, but now he goes around 
celebrated.”183  The interviewee added, “There is no record of 
justice in Kenya.”184  Another interviewee noted that prior to the 
post-election violence in 2007 “there was a lot of impunity” and 
“anyone could perpetrate anything before the ICC got 
involved.”185 
2. Assessing the Social Deterrent Effect
Even if the evidence does not suggest evidence of legal
deterrence during this time period, we look for evidence of a 
social deterrent effect in order to test the hypotheses and 
findings of Jo and Simmons.  Based on their quantitative large-N 
study, they concluded that the ICC produces a social deterrent 
effect on state actors, more so than rebels, because state actors 
are most likely to be responsive to international and domestic 
180 Mueller, Kenya and the ICC, supra note 169, at 29. 
181 See Situations Under Investigation, supra note 87. 
182 See Thomas Obel Hansen, The International Criminal Court in Kenya: Three 
Defining Features of a Contested Accountability Process and Their Implications for 
the Future of International Justice, 18 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 187, 198 (2012) 
(referencing the ICC cases in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 
183 Interview with Subject 417. 
184 Id. 
185 Interview with Subject 349. 
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pressures to conform their behavior to acceptable norms.  We, 
however, find little evidence that Kenya’s government actors  
were socially deterred during this time period, despite the fact 
that Kenya had important relationships with the international 
community and an increasingly activist civil society. 
During this time period, Kenya was integrated into the 
international community with trade and aid relationships. 
According to data maintained by the World Bank, between 2005 
and 2007 Kenya received a total of approximately US $3 billion 
in official aid.186  Such amounts easily put Kenya amongst the 
upper echelons of those receiving aid.  In fact, in 2005 alone, 
Kenya gave up US $9.8 million in military aid when it refused to 
succumb to United States’ pressure to sign a bilateral agreement 
promising not to transfer any U.S. citizen to the ICC to be 
prosecuted.187  Also, after Kibaki came into power, Kenya had a 
growing civil society sector.188  That sector played a role in 
pushing for ICC ratification.189 
Nevertheless, the evidence demonstrates that the country’s 
leaders once again instrumentally employed violence in their 
quest for power after the results of the 2007 presidential 
elections were announced.  Nor did Kenya make any remarkable 
strides in terms of domestic protections against human rights 
abuses during this time period.  While causal inferences always 
come with disclaimers, the evidence does not suggest that Kenya 
was significantly influenced during this time period by any 
international or domestic social shaming to significantly improve 
its domestic practices to avoid the specter of an ICC prosecution. 
186 See Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received, THE 
WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?page=1 (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2017). 
187 See Fred Oluoch, Kenya: Will Kibaki Succumb to U.S. Pressure?, NEW 
AFRICAN, Aug–Sept. 2005, at 27 (noting that Kenya was risking U.S. $9.8 million in 
military aid); Press Release, CICC, Global Coalition Voices Support for Kenya’s On-
Going Resistance to U.S. ICC Immunity Agreement: Kenya’s Firm Stand in 
Defending ICC Integrity is Welcomed by International NGOs (July 20, 2005), 
http://archive.iccnow.org/documents/KenyaresistBIA_pr.pdf (praising Kenya for 
refusing to sign the bilateral agreement). 
188 For example, in 2003, Kenya established the Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights. The Human Rights Act, KENYA NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, http://knchr.org/HumanRights/ThehumanrightsAct.aspx (last visited Aug. 
4, 2017). 
189 See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 81, at 143 (stating that Kenya joined the court 
in 2005 after an international and civil society campaign encouraging membership).  
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B. Immediate Aftermath of the 2007 Post-Election Violence Until
the March 2010 Authorization to Commence a Formal
Investigation
1. Assessing the ICC’s Legal Deterrent Effect at the
Preliminary Examination Level of Intervention
After the post-election violence and until the court
authorized the prosecutor to commence a formal investigation 
into the Kenyan situation, Kenya became the subject of an ICC 
preliminary examination—a higher level of intervention than 
ratification alone.190  The evidence, however, is mixed as to 
whether the ICC’s preliminary examination intervention 
produced a legal deterrent effect.  Some evidence suggests (1) a 
reduction in the incidence of mass atrocities or human rights 
abuses and (2) an increase in domestic mechanisms for holding 
perpetrators of such crimes accountable.  On the other hand, not 
all of the evidence on either front is positive. 
First, as to Kenya’s human rights practices, the post-election 
violence ended by February 2008, and the country did not 
experience any repeat of mass violence during the ICC’s 
preliminary examination period.  The absence of mass violence is 
certainly an improvement.  However, whether this improvement 
actually came about through the Kenyan government’s 
commitment to protecting against mass atrocities and human 
rights abuses can be questioned.  Also during this time period, 
some evidence shows that individuals who could ostensibly be 
witnesses in any prosecution of perpetrators of the post-election 
violence were allegedly being killed or disappeared.  The ICC 
prosecutor has charged that during 2008 and 2009, Kenyatta had 
members of the Mungiki gang killed “in order to cover up his 
involvement with them and through them in the post-election 
violence.”191  These allegations have not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, though Mungiki members have disappeared or 
been found dead.  In March 2008, the wife of one Mungiki leader 
190 See, e.g., Press Release, ICC OTP, Prosecutor Receives Materials on Post-
election Violence in Kenya (July 16, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item. 
aspx?name=pr438 (noting that Kenya had been the subject of an ICC preliminary 
examination since February 2008). 
191 Walter Menya, Shocking: Uhuru ‘Killed’ All Mungiki Witnesses Says ICC 
Prosecutor Bensouda, KENYA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.kenya-today.com/n 
ews/uhuru-kenyatta-killed-mungiki-witnesses-says-icc-prosecutor-bensouda. 
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was murdered.192  A few months later, Mungiki’s Nairobi 
Coordinator was killed.  According to the ICC prosecutor, two 
Mungiki leaders arrested by police in April and June of 2008, 
respectively, are presumed dead.  A Mungiki leader in Naivasha 
arrested by police in May 2009 is also presumed dead.193  On the 
day of the OTP’s request to open an investigation into the 
Kenyan situation, another prominent member of the Mungiki 
was killed.194 
What, though, does the evidence suggest may have been the 
role of the ICC in producing the absence of violence after 
February 2008?  Our analysis indicates that the ICC’s role was 
small as compared to the role of the international and domestic 
communities.  As of February 2008, the ICC had only issued one 
statement saying it was watching Kenya.195  The international 
and domestic communities, by contrast, were actively engaged 
during February 2008 in taking steps to end the violence.  The 
international community intervened in early February 2008 to 
establish a mediation process, the Kenyan National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation (“KNDR”) process, led by former Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan.196  The mediation led 
by Annan concluded on February 28, 2008 with the 
announcement of a National Accord197 and an agreement to form 
192 Cyrus Ombati, Kenya: Mungiki Leader’s Wife Executed, THE EAST AFRICAN 
STANDARD (NAIROBI) (Apr. 12, 2008), http://allafrica.com/stories/200804111177.html. 
193 Who Planned Naivasha PEV Murder Attacks of January 2008?, ALLAFRICA: 
THE HAGUE TRIALS KENYA (Apr. 16, 2015, 2:04 PM), http://allafrica.com/stories/2015 
04171235.html. 
194 Kamore Maina, Mungiki Witness Reveals Why He Quit Uhuru Case, THE 
STAR (KENYA) (Dec. 23, 2013 12:00 AM), http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/12/23/ 
mungiki-witness-reveals-why-he-quit-uhuru-case_c874373; Caspar Waithaka & 
John Ngirachu, Mungiki Leader Killed in Nairobi, DAILY NATION (Nov. 5, 2009), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-/1056/682504/-/4cjm1fz/-/index.html. 
195 ICC OTP, OTP Statement in Relation to Events in Kenya (Feb. 5, 2008), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1BB89202-16AE-4D95-ABBB-
4597C416045D/0/ICCOTPST20080205ENG.pdf 
196  See Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation: One Year Later, KOFI 
ANNAN FOUNDATION (Mar. 28, 2009), http://kofiannanfoundation.org/our-work/ 
kenya-national-dialogue-and-reconciliation. 
197 The Accord included important agreements on four main agenda items: 
(1) take immediate action to stop the violence and restore fundamental rights and
liberties; (2) resolve the humanitarian crisis, promote reconciliation, heal, and
restore calm; (3) overcome the political crisis; (4) and address long-term issues.
SOUTH CONSULTING, THE KENYA NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION
(KNDR) MONITORING PROJECT (2009), http://katibainstitute.org/Archives/images/
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a coalition government, with Kibaki acting as President and 
Odinga as Prime Minister.198  When Annan announced the 
power-sharing deal in late February 2008, Kibaki and Odinga 
urged their supporters to stop fighting and respect the 
arrangement.199  During February 2008, civil society was also 
pressing for an end to the violence, having organized themselves 
under the umbrella group “Concerned Citizens for Peace” 
(“CCP”).  The CCP was active in getting the leadership of the  
Orange Democratic Movement (“ODM”) and Party of National 
Unity (“PNU”) to mediate and was behind invitations to some of 
the prominent Africans to aid in mediation efforts.200 
The evidence is similarly mixed regarding any increase in 
Kenya’s domestic protections against human rights abuses.  On a 
positive note, as part of the mediation process following the post-
election violence, the Kenyan government agreed to implement 
institutional reforms, including judicial and constitutional 
reforms.201  In July 2009, the government created a task force to 
make specific recommendations on how to enhance the 
effectiveness and independence of the judiciary.202  The 
government also drafted a new constitution providing for checks 
and balances on government power.203  Kenya adopted that new 
constitution in August 2010.204  In addition, in 2009 Kenya 
Monitoring%20and%20Evaluation%20Report%20on%20the%20National%20Accord.
pdf. 
198 See Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government 
(Feb 28. 2008), http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KE_080228_ 
Acting%20Together%20for%20KenyaAgreement%20on%20the%20Principles%20of%
20Partnership%20of%20the%20Coalition%20Government.pdf. 
199 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenya Rivals Reach Peace Agreement, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/29/world/africa/29kenya.html. 
200 L. Muthoni Wanyeki, The International Criminal Court’s Cases in Kenya: 
Origin and Impact, INST. SECURITY STUD., no. 237, Aug. 2012, at 5. 
201 Kenya: Mediation is Making Progress - Kofi Annan, RELIEFWEB (Feb. 15, 
2008), http://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/kenya-mediation-making-progress-kofi-anna 
n. 
202 NANA EFFAH-APENTENG, ET AL., BACK FROM THE BRINK: THE 2008 
MEDIATION PROCESS AND REFORMS IN KENYA 5 (2014), http://www.knchr.org/Portals 
/0/GeneralReports/backFromBrink_web.pdf. 
203 See Mike Sunderland, Kofi Annan Warns of Return to Violence in Kenya, 
VOA NEWS (Dec. 9, 2009, 4:58 AM), http://www.voanews.com/content/kofi-annan-
violence-kenya-08dec09--78874397/416289.html (noting that the Kenyan 
government released a draft of a new constitution to the public in November 2009). 
204 Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenyans Approve New Constitution, N.Y. Times (Aug. 5, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/world/africa/06kenya.html. For a copy of 
Kenya’s 2010 constitution, see Constitution of Kenya, 2010, KENYA LAW, 
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passed the International Crimes Act, which incorporated the 
definition of international crimes from the ICC into its domestic 
laws.205  This development is positive, as it means that Kenya can 
then prosecute domestically any individuals who commit 
genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. 
As above, the question then is what role, if any, did the ICC 
play in producing these positive reforms?  According to some of 
our interviewees, the answer is that the 2010 constitution can, in 
part, be attributed to ICC involvement.  Interviewees stated that 
government leaders may have pushed more for a new 
constitution because they believed that it would help them 
persuade the ICC to go away.206  One interviewee even argued 
that the government rushed the constitution through in an 
attempt to protect itself and its close allies from ICC 
prosecution.207  And as discussed in more detail below, Kenya has  
argued that the Kenyan cases were not admissible before the ICC 
because the country had improved its own courts and was able to 
try the suspects under the new International Crimes Act.208 
On the negative side, although Kenya implemented some 
institutional reforms on paper, the country did not alter its 
previous practice of allowing impunity for mass atrocities.  As 
part of the mediation process following the post-election violence, 
the Kenyan government established the Commission of Inquiry 
to Investigate the Post-Election Violence (“CIPEV”), also known 
as the Waki Commission.209  The Waki Commission released its 
report in October 2008, wherein it recommended establishing a 
Special Tribunal in Kenya with judges from Kenya and from the 
international community to investigate and prosecute 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010 (last visited Aug. 8, 
2017). 
205 Okuta, supra note 163, at 1072–73. 
206 Interview with Subject 692, 951. 
207 Interview with Subject 234. 
208 See Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case Nos. ICC-01/09-01/11, ICC-01/09-02/11, 
Application on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to 
Article 19 of the ICC Statute, ¶ 25 (Mar. 31, 2011). 
209 The Waki Commission got its name after its Chair, Justice Philip Waki, a 
judge on Kenya’s Court of Appeals. The Waki Commission included two other 
commissioners: Mr. Gavin McFadyen from New Zealand and Mr. Pascal Kambale 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Additionally, “[t]wo Kenyans, Mr. David 
Majanja and Mr. George Kegoro, were appointed the Counsel Assisting the 
Commission and Commission Secretary,” respectively. Waki Commission Report, 
supra note 161, at 1. 
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responsible individuals.210  The Kenyan government, however, 
did not implement the Commission’s recommendations.211  It 
never established a Special Tribunal, even though it was given 
several extensions of the original deadline to do so.212  Nor did it 
institute any other domestic proceedings to bring perpetrators to 
justice.213  Finally, in late July 2009, the Kenyan government 
issued a statement saying that the cabinet had rejected the idea  
of setting up a Special Tribunal and decided instead to permit 
the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (“TJRC”) to 
deal with perpetrators of the post-election violence.214 
Kenya created the TJRC in 2008 as part of the process 
immediately following the post-election violence.  The 
Commission’s mandate, though, was to investigate abuses from 
1963 onward.  The TJRC has taken witness statements.  As of 
December 2014, the government had not implemented any of the 
TJRC’s recommendations.215 
Accordingly, during this preliminary examination phase, the 
evidence still suggests that Kenya was not committed to holding 
anyone accountable for the post-election violence.  The evidence 
also indicates that the country did not fear the ICC enough to 
actually implement domestic processes to try those responsible 
210 See id. at 472. 
211 See Brown & Sriram, supra note 138, at 250 (“It is only a small exaggeration 
to claim that no commission of inquiry in Kenya has ever led to anything beyond a 
report.”). 
212 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Under Wraps, Kenya’s Bill for Bloodshed Nears 
Payment, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/world/ 
africa/16kenya.html (describing Parliament’s July 2009 rejection of a bill to establish 
a Special Tribunal); Hansen, supra note 182, at 193 (noting that the Kenyan 
Parliament failed several times to create the Special Tribunal). 
213 See Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in 
the Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010),¶¶ 183–86 , https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/ 
record.aspx?uri=854287 (concluding that Kenya had not commenced any 
investigations or prosecutions of those most responsible for the violence). 
214 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “TURNING PEBBLES”: EVADING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KENYA 23 (Dec. 2011), https://www.hrw.org/sites/de 
fault/files/reports/kenya1211webwcover_0.pdf. The government, however, said 
confusingly that the cabinet’s decision did not “reduce its desire to punish impunity.” 
Government of Kenya, Kenya: Cabinet Decides on TJRC, RELIEFWEB (July 30, 
2009), reliefweb.int/report/kenya/kenya-cabinet-decides-tjrc. 
215 INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & KENYA HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMISSION, ONE YEAR IN OFFICE FOR UHURU KENYATTA AND WILLIAM RUTO 15 
(Feb. 2014), https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/kenya631a2014bassdef.pdf [hereinafter 
ONE YEAR IN OFFICE]. 
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for the violence in 2007 or 2008.  This conclusion is consistent 
with the views shared by some of our interviewees.  Several 
stated that before the ICC published the names of the suspects, 
people saw the ICC as an empty threat and a court with no 
teeth,216 referring to Ruto’s comment that “the court would take 
some 90 years or more before it does anything.”217  
In fact, the evidence shows that Kenya’s leaders may have 
believed they could endlessly stall the ICC so that it would not 
act.  The ICC prosecutor repeatedly warned Kenyan leaders 
during 2009 that impunity was not an option and that the ICC 
would intervene if Kenya did not establish a Special Tribunal.218  
The Kenyan government responded by repeatedly failing to 
create the tribunal.  Kenyan leaders also made promises that 
they did not keep.  In July 2009, Kenyan leaders told the ICC 
prosecutor that they would self-refer the situation to the ICC in 
the event that the Special Tribunal was not created.219  They 
never did so, and the prosecutor instead used his proprio motu 
powers—the prosecutor’s power in the Rome Statute to 
commence cases on his own motion to the court without referral 
from a State Party or the U.N. Security Council—to mount the 
Kenya cases.220  Kibaki and Odinga also reportedly agreed that 
any individuals named as ICC suspects would be expelled from 
government.  Yet they never forced any of the suspects out.221 
On the other hand, Kenyan leaders may have viewed 
creating a Special Tribunal as a move that could prove extremely 
threatening to themselves and their allies.  As Brown and Sriram 
216 Interview with Subject 338, 349, 475. 
217 Interview with Subject 391, 444. 
218 See ICC OTP, ICC Prosecutor Reaffirms That the Situation in Kenya is 
Monitored By His Office (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/064553 
18-783E-403B-8C9F-8E2056720C15/279793/KenyaOTPpubliccommunication200902
11.pdf (stating that the Office of the Prosecutor is monitoring the Kenya situation
while the Kenyan Parliament debates potentially establishing a Special Tribunal);
see also Press Release, ICC OTP, ICC-Kenya High-Level Delegation meets ICC
Prosecutor (July 3, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr431.
219 See Press Release, ICC OTP, ICC Prosecutor Supports Three-Pronged 
Approach to Justice in Kenya (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/ite 
m.aspx?name=pr456.
220 See, e.g., ICC OTP, The Post-Election Violence and Mediation ¶ 10,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/26D853E3-83A6-45F1-BEE9-8B64E3723C55/0/ 
BackgroundNoteKenyaJanuary2012.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2017); Prosecutor to Ask 
for ICC Investigation, RFI (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www1.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/119/ 
article_5766.asp. 
221 Interview with Subject 391. 
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state, “[W]hereas the Special Tribunal could prosecute hundreds 
of suspects, the ICC could only pursue a half-dozen perpetrators 
at the highest level.”222  Thus, before the ICC prosecutor named 
suspects, some parliamentarians could reasonably believe the 
ICC would not target them because they were not “big fish.”223  In 
other words, the ICC might pose a threat to some individuals in 
Kenya, but not to all of the parliamentarians who had to vote for 
a bill to establish the Special Tribunal.  Brown and Sriram argue 
that some parliamentarians might have believed at that time 
before names were revealed that the ICC could be “useful in 
removing [their] political rivals.”224  A former executive director 
of the Kenyan Human Rights Commission makes a similar point, 
stating that parliamentarians voted down the Special Tribunal 
because they only wanted accountability for their opponents, not 
for members of their own political party.225 
2. Assessing the Social Deterrent Effect
During the ICC’s preliminary examination phase, the facts
show that both the international and domestic community were 
calling for Kenya to end the post-election violence and introduce 
reforms and other processes to ensure that perpetrators of the 
violence were held accountable.  As described above, the 
mediation process led by Kofi Annan and backed by the  
international and domestic communities seems to have 
contributed to the cessation of the violence and some 
institutional reforms. 
Still, Kenyan leaders ignored the numerous calls to end the 
country’s cycle of impunity.  In December 2008, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Kenya said that his government would welcome a 
request to provide investigative experts for a Special Tribunal.226  
In December 2009, Kofi Annan publicly complained about the 
slow pace of reforms in Kenya to address the post-election 
violence.227  Kenya’s section of the International Commission of 
Jurists issued a letter in July 2009 urging Kenya to establish a 
222 Brown & Sriram, supra note 138, at 253. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Wanyeki, supra note 200, at 9. 
226 US To Support Kenya’s Post-election Violence Special Tribunal, AFRIK NEWS 
(Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.afrik-news.com/article15021.html. 
227 See Sunderland, supra note 203. 
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Special Tribunal that would be beyond the reach of Kenya’s 
Attorney General, who the jurists alleged uses his powers to keep 
his political friends from being brought to justice in Kenya’s 
domestic courts.228  In August 2009, Human Rights Watch called 
for Kenya to immediately establish a Special Tribunal.229  The  
Kenyan Civil Society has also complained about the cabinet’s 
decision to abandon the process towards creating a Special 
Tribunal.230 
On the whole, then, there is a lack of evidence to support a 
social deterrent effect during this time period because ultimately 
Kenya did not embrace any of the proposed structural changes or 
normative changes, such as new and more independent 
institutions designed to enable it to hold perpetrators of the 
violence accountable.  Kenyan leaders refused to establish the 
Special Tribunal.  Moreover, Kenyan leaders did not embrace an 
international accountability process; although Kenya agreed to 
refer the situation to the ICC, its leaders did not do so. 
C. Naming of Suspects Until the ICC Prosecutor Suspends the
Case Against Kenyatta
1. Assessing the ICC’s Legal Deterrent Effect at the
Prosecution Level of Intervention
In December 2010, the ICC again increased its level of
intervention in Kenya:  It began investigating and prosecuting 
specific suspects.  In December 2010, the then-ICC prosecutor 
shared with the press the names of the six prominent Kenyans 
who he said would be charged with crimes against humanity 
because they bore the greatest responsibility for the violence.231   
228 Press Release, Wilfred Nderitu, Chairman, ICJ Kenya, Press Statement by 
the ICJ Kenya on the Establishment of the Special Tribunal for Kenya, ICJ Kenya 
(July 10, 2009), https://www.iccnow.org/documents/ICJ_Press_Statement._STK._M 
ombasa.pdf. 
229 Noor Khamis, Kenya: Deliver Justice for Victims of Post-Election Violence, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 3, 2009, 4:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009 
/08/03/kenya-deliver-justice-victims-post-election-violence. 
230 Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice, KPTJ Statement on Cabinet Calls 
for Special Tribunal (Dec. 15, 2010), https://kenyastockholm.com/2010/12/ 
15/kptj-statement-on-cabinet-calls-for-speacial-tribunal. 
231 See Kariuki & Mathenge, supra note 19. 
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In March 2011, the ICC issued summonses for six prominent 
Kenyans—three each from Kibaki’s and Odinga’s political 
parties.232 
According to the ICC prosecutor’s charges filed in 2010, 
William Ruto, the former Minister of Higher Education, Science 
and Technology and current Deputy President, Henry Kosgey, 
Minister of Industrialization, and Joshua arap Sang, Head of 
Operations at Kass FM, allegedly worked together to prepare a 
criminal plan to attack members of the PNU.  The charges state 
they implemented the plan immediately after the announcement 
of the election results declaring Kibaki president.  Specifically, 
they mobilized perpetrators to attack PNU supporters, which the 
perpetrators did by burning homes and buildings and killing 
civilians.  The prosecutor charged that Uhuru Kenyatta, former 
Deputy Prime Minister, Francis Muthaura, former Secretary to 
the Cabinet, and Mohammad Ali, former Commissioner of the 
Kenyan Police, responded to the attacks on PNU supporters by 
developing and executing a plan to attack perceived ODM 
supporters in order to keep the PNU in power.  Among other 
things, the charges state that Kenyatta facilitated a plan 
whereby pro-PNU youth, including members of the Mungiki, 
were employed to attack ODM civilian supporters in the Nakuru 
and Naivasha districts of Kenya—attacks that left some 150 
ODM supporters dead.233  On January 23, 2012, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber confirmed charges against four out of the six 
individuals, but it refused to confirm charges against Kosgey and 
Ali because the prosecutor had not met the necessary evidentiary 
threshold for proceeding.234 
Above, we set out our reasons for expecting that an increased 
level of intervention by the ICC should generally produce a 
deterrent effect.  We argued that increasing the ICC’s level of 
intervention increases the costs, making it more likely that the 
232 See Press Release, ICC  OTP, Kenya’s Post Election Violence: ICC Prosecutor 
Presents Cases against Six Individuals for Crimes against Humanity (Dec. 15, 
2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=pr615. 
233 See Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09, Prosecutor's Application 
Pursuant to Article 58 as to William Samoei Ruto, Henrey Kiprono Kosgey, and 
Joshua Arap Sang, ¶¶ 1–3 (Dec. 15, 2010). 
234 Id. ¶¶ 110, 138, 152; see also Tom Maliti, ICC Confirms Charges Against 
Four Out of Six Kenyan Suspects, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2012/01/icc-confirms-charges-against-four-out-of-six-
kenyan-suspects. 
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ICC can legally dissuade individuals from committing crimes and 
persuade the government to institute measures of domestic 
accountability.  In such cases, the ICC has demonstrated an 
ability to act, and the rational actor should refrain from 
committing any obvious bad acts that might attract additional 
attention from the ICC.  At the same time, we also hypothesized 
that a very high level of ICC intervention may also produce an 
unintended or perverse effect when it directly threatens leaders 
seeking to hold or gain power.  Under these circumstances, state 
leaders in non-democracies or unconsolidated democracies may 
conclude that there is little reason to refrain from committing 
abuses that can aid them in their bid for power. 
a. Evidence Regarding Mass Atrocities and Other Human Rights
Abuses
During this investigation phase, the evidence does show a
reduction in mass atrocities in that Kenya’s 2013 presidential 
elections were relatively peaceful.235  Further, the evidence 
indicates that the ICC’s intervention likely played a role in 
producing this outcome in two ways.  First, in an effort to 
discredit the ICC and defeat opponent Raila Odinga,236 ICC 
suspects and former political and ethnical rivals, Kenyatta and 
Ruto, created the Jubilee Coalition so that they could run for 
president and deputy president, respectively, in Kenya’s 2013 
elections.237  This may have mitigated tensions between different 
ethnic groups.  Numerous interviewees confirmed that the ICC 
was the impetus for this unusual alliance.  Others said that the 
ICC involvement triggered the Jubilee Coalition, which in turn 
may have contributed to more peaceful elections.238  Some 
interviewees even argued that the ICC provided inspiration for 
the coalition:  “[Kenyatta and Ruto] were coming together to 
defeat ICC”239 and “[t]he ICC was the glue.”240 
235 See Mueller, Kenya and the ICC, supra note 169, at 25. 
236 See, e.g., Sara Kendall, 'UhuRuto' and Other Leviathans: The International 
Criminal Court and the Kenyan Political Order, 7 AFR. J. LEG. STUD. 399, 409 
(2014). 
237 See Mueller, Kenya and the ICC, supra note 169, at 35 (suggesting that the 
Jubilee Coalition understood that political power was important to avoid ICC 
prosecution). 
238 Interview with Subject 462, 582, 859. 
239 Interview with Subject 618, 582, 338. 
240 Interview with Subject 692. 
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A review of the Jubilee Coalition’s campaign rhetoric further 
confirms that the ICC cases pushed Kenyatta and Ruto together. 
Kenyatta and Ruto turned the election into a referendum against 
the ICC by using slogans such as (1) “[a] vote for us is a vote of no 
confidence in the ICC,” used by Kenyatta and (2) “[p]residential 
victory for the Jubilee Alliance may indicate there is something 
wrong with the charges its two leaders are facing at The Hague,” 
used by Ruto.241  Other campaign messages cast the ICC in a 
negative light: the court was biased against Africa, it did not 
investigate thoroughly, and it constituted an act of neo-
colonialism.242  Their anti-ICC rhetoric did not stop there.  They 
also focused their sights on their political opponent for the 
presidency, Raila Odinga.  According to statements of the Jubilee 
Coalition, Odinga was actually guilty of committing crimes 
during the 2007 post-election violence and was only voicing  
support for the ICC in his campaign because he wanted to get rid 
of Kenyatta and Ruto as political opponents, not because he 
actually believed in the ICC and its norms.243 
In addition, the ICC apparently played a role in causing 
Kenyatta and Ruto to campaign in a way that did not incite 
ethnic violence.  In fact, in 2011, an ICC presiding judge told the 
two ICC suspects during a court appearance that she had read 
“newspaper reports to the effect that some of the suspects are 
engaging in hate speech which could occasion fresh chaos” and 
that such speeches “could be interpreted as inducement to violate 
the conditions set by the court and which include that the 
suspects should not commit fresh crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the court.”244  The court warned that it was prepared to issue 
new arrest warrants if the evidence showed that candidates were 
preaching hatred.  While direct causation is difficult to establish, 
the candidates did begin preaching peace and reconciliation after  
241 Pheroze Nowrojee, The March 4 Polls and the ICC Cases, THE STAR (KENYA) 
(Feb. 6, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/02/06/the-march-4-
polls-and-the-icc-cases_c734975. 
242 Gabrielle Lynch, Electing the 'Alliance of the Accused': The Success of the 
Jubilee Alliance in Kenya’s Rift Valley, 8 J. E. AFR. STUD. 93, 105 (2014). 
243 See Mueller, Kenya and the ICC, supra note 169, at 35. 
244 Nzau Musau, Kenya: ICC Warns Ocampo 6 Over Hate Speech, THE STAR 
(NAIROBI) (Apr. 8, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201104080928.html. 
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this warning.245  The week before the 2013 elections, Kenyatta 
and Ruto even joined together with opponent Odinga to hold a 
prayer rally to promote non-violent elections.246 
Preaching peace, instead of inter-ethnic violence, during 
presidential election campaigns was a rather new phenomenon. 
Kenya has a winner-takes-all system that gives winning 
candidates unchallenged access to public office and ability to 
control the distribution of state resources.247  The benefits 
associated with obtaining a leadership position in Kenya’s 
government are so high that politicians and their constituencies 
have been willing to resort to violence to win.248  Additionally, 
Kenya’s political leaders represent and advance the interests of 
their ethnic group because the country’s political parties are 
based on ethnicity.249  This means that the ethnic groups whose 
leaders lose the elections will most likely be denied full access to 
important resources, jobs, income, and healthcare until the next 
political transition.250  In Kenya, electing a new president 
becomes a highly charged competition for ethnic supremacy.251 
245 Peter Leftie, Uhuru and Ruto Vow to Preach Peace, DAILY NATION (Apr. 11, 
2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Uhuru-and-Ruto-vow-to-preach-peace-/-
/1064/1142960/-/7hklm3/-/index.html (noting that the leaders’ message of peace was 
a strong break from the combative statements the two had made before their initial 
appearance in The Hague the week before). 
246 Simon Ndonga, Kenyan Presidential Candidates Promise Peaceful Election, 
AFRICA – NEWS AND ANALYSIS (Feb. 25, 2013), http://africajournalismtheworld.com/ 
tag/kenyatta-promises-peaceful-election/. 
247 See Mueller, Dying to Win, supra note 141, at 105 (stating that electing a 
fellow ethnic politician as president who controls the state would allow the ethnic 
group to gain access to state resources and positions); Fred Jonyo, The Centrality of 
Ethnicity in Kenya’s Political Transition, in THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION IN KENYA: 
FROM KANU TO NARC 166 (Walter O. Oyugi, et al. eds., 2003) (stating that the ethnic 
groups whose leaders lose the elections will be discriminated against and denied 
access to resources); JAMES NDUNG’U & MANASSEH WEPUNDI, TRANSITION AND 
REFORM: PEOPLE’S PEACEMAKING PERSPECTIVES ON KENYA’S POST-2008 POLITICAL 
CRISIS AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 1 (Mar. 2012) (stating that one factor that 
explains the violence in Kenya is the skewed allocation of state positions and 
resources by political leaders). 
248 Mueller, Dying to Win, supra note 141, at 105.  
249 See Steeves, supra note 160, at 462; Mueller, Dying to Win, supra note 141, 
at 104. 
250 Jonyo, supra note 247, at 166. This pattern of behavior is well entrenched. 
Jomo Kenyatta favored his own people, the Kikuyu, and allowed family and allies to 
acquire extensive land in the fertile Rift Valley. His successor, Moi, gave members of 
his ethnic community, the Kalenjin, positions in the army, police and civil service. 
Mwai Kibaki, who took office in 2002, followed in his predecessors’ footsteps and 
excluded ethnic groups other than Kikuyu from the distribution of benefits. See 
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But 2013 was different, and numerous interviewees noted 
the break with the past.  One interviewee stated that Kenyatta, 
Ruto, and other politicians chose their words more carefully than 
in the past since they knew the ICC was watching; they did not 
want to be accused of saying anything that seemed to incite 
violence.  Several mentioned that in the 2013 presidential 
campaign, unlike the campaigns of the past, the candidates were 
careful not to be seen with any military gangs—apparently in the 
past, candidates gave speeches with military gangs carrying 
weapons in the background as a show of force.252  According to a 
member of a non-governmental organization, Kenyan civil society 
used the fact of the ICC’s presence to remind candidates that if 
they said anything that incited violence, it would put them at 
greater risk with the ICC.253  Another interviewee even argued 
that Kenyatta and Ruto refrained from inciting violence during  
the 2013 elections as this could provide evidence for them to 
suggest that they also did not incite violence during the 2007 
elections.254 
Consistent with our expectations, the ICC’s increased level of 
intervention seems to have produced some deterrent effect in the 
form of more peaceful elections in 2013.  That result makes sense 
from a rational cost-benefit standpoint.  Kenyan leaders knew 
that the ICC was watching them, and interview evidence 
indicates that leaders had altered their views about the threat 
posed by the ICC.  Kenyan politicians could no longer “play the 
games” they did with the domestic justice system and “could not 
unduly influence the ICC prosecutor or the ICC judges to rule in 
their favors.”255  Indeed, the ICC’s powers were sufficient to 
convince the Kenyan suspects to voluntarily appear in The 
Hague in 2011 to answer the charges against them.256  And 
Thomas G. Weiss, Halting Atrocities in Kenya, GREAT DECISIONS 17 (Dec. 21, 2010), 
http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/kenya-fpa-weiss.pdf. 
251 See Steeves, supra note 160, at 455. 
252 Interview with Subject 582, 391, 859. 
253 Interview with Subject 333 (stating that civil society also embraced the ICC 
as a tool to keep Kenyan politicians in check). 
254 Interview with Subject 417. 
255 Interview with Subject 568, 724. 
256 CNN Wire Staff, Kenyans at The Hague on ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ 
Charges, CNN (Apr. 8, 2011, 6:15 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/0–
4/07/kenya.international.court/index.html (noting that three suspects were in The 
Hague for their first appearance and that the other three would be appearing shortly 
thereafter); see also interview with Subject 724. 
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individuals we interviewed did say having their leaders 
summoned to The Hague sent a powerful message about the 
accountability of their leaders.  The ICC reportedly contributed 
to the “demystification” of the power of a sitting president.257  
One interviewee said that the moment that the ICC prosecutor 
announced the names of the suspects was a “game changer”.258  
Another interviewee argued that up until this point people 
thought it would just be “business as usual;”259 however, when 
the names were presented, Kenyans changed their perceptions 
about justice since the “untouchables could now be touched.”260 
On the other hand, the evidence shows that the ICC’s 
increased level of intervention has also produced an unintended 
or perverse effect.  While the threat increased the cost side of the 
equation, it also seems to have caused influential state actors to 
even more highly value power and to take steps to ensure they 
could obtain or hold on to power.  They did not commit obvious 
crimes:  Kenyatta and Ruto were careful to preach peace after 
the ICC judge warned that additional charges would be  
forthcoming if the evidence showed the leaders were preaching 
hate.  But as the trials grew nearer, so too did reports that state 
leaders were interfering with the ICC’s witnesses. 
The OTP dropped its case against Muthaura in March 2013 
after one key witness against that defendant admitted to 
receiving bribes and lying to the court.261  In May 2013, the ICC 
prosecutor informed the ICC judges that prosecution witnesses in 
the Kenyatta and Ruto cases had reported being targeted by 
Kenyan government officials seeking to influence their 
testimony.262  Although the suspects in the Kenya cases deny that 
they have played any part in having witnesses bribed, the ICC  
257 Interview with Subject 576. 
258 Interview with Subject 234, 568, 475. 
259 Interview with Subject 568. 
260 Interview with Subject 859, 591. 
261 See, e.g., ALL BARK NO BITE? STATE COOPERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, KENYANS FOR PEACE WITH TRUTH AND JUSTICE 11 (Dec. 2014) 
[hereinafter ALL BARK NO BITE?]; Bernard Momanyi & Simon Jennings, Kenya 
Witnesses Face Harassment, GLOBAL VOICES AFRICA (June 5, 2013), 
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/kenya-witnesses-face-harassment. 
262 See Momanyi & Jennings, supra note 261. 
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did issue an arrest warrant for Kenyan journalist, Walter 
Barasa, for allegedly furthering a bribery scheme devised by a 
circle of officials within the Kenyan administration.263 
Witness interference has gone beyond offering bribes.  In 
2013, twelve witnesses who were scheduled to testify in the trial 
against Ruto and Sang said they had received persistent threats 
to their safety warning them of participating in the trial.264  In 
early 2014, the OTP withdrew from its witness list several 
witnesses against Kenyatta who were “concerned that testifying 
against Mr. Kenyatta would expose them or their families to 
retaliation.”265  According to the OTP, the Kenyan government 
led by Kenyatta and Ruto was not doing its part to put an end to 
the pervasive practice of witness tampering.266  Ultimately, so  
many witnesses backed out from testifying at the ICC because of 
witness interference267 that the OTP dropped its cases against 
Muthaura and Kenyatta.268 
Individuals we interviewed said they believed the OTP’s 
claims that the Kenyan government had interfered with 
witnesses.  One said that it is to be expected that a government 
would not turn over evidence against itself.269  Another said that 
some portion of the Kenyan public thinks that Kenyatta, Ruto, 
263 ICC Seeks Walter Barasa Arrest for Kenya ‘Witness Tampering’, BBC NEWS 
(Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24364778. 
264 See IWPR Contributors, Further Threats to ICC’s Kenya Witnesses, GLOBAL 
VOICES AFRICA (Aug. 29, 2013), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/further-threats-iccs-
kenya-witnesses. 
265 See ALL BARK NO BITE?, supra note 261, at 11–12; see also IWPR 
Contributors, Further Threats to ICC’s Kenya Witnesses, supra note 264 (reporting 
that two witnesses had retracted their agreements to testify against Kenyatta and 
that other witnesses in the ICC cases are now dead). 
266 See IWPR Contributors, Further Threats to ICC’s Kenya Witnesses, supra 
note 264. 
267 See Natalia Ojewska, Uhuru Kenyatta’s Trial: A Case Study in What’s Wrong 
with the ICC, GLOBAL POST (Feb. 6, 2014, 6:46 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/ 
dispatch/news/regions/africa/kenya/140206/uhuru-kenyattas-trial-case-study-whats-
wrong-the-icc (quoting the ICC Prosecutor as saying that the scale of witness 
interference in the Kenya cases was unprecedented). 
268 Marlise Simons & Jeffrey Gettleman, International Court Ends Case Against 
Kenyan President in Election Unrest, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.nytime 
s.com/2014/12/06/world/africa/uhuru-kenyatta-kenya-international-criminal-court-
withdraws-charges-of-crimes-against-humanity.html [hereinafter Simons &
Gettleman, International Court]; Press Release, ICC OTP, Statement of the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the Withdrawal
of Charges Against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-05-12-2014-2.
269 Interview with Subject 417. 
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and their supporters have been involved in threatening 
witnesses.270  Finally, one interviewee said that although the 
Kenyan government is supposed to ensure that witnesses are 
protected, “no rational man would really want to testify against 
the president.”271 
b. Evidence Regarding Domestic Mechanisms To Punish Human
Rights Abuses
Despite its new constitution and judicial reforms, between
2010 and December 2014, the facts show that Kenya has made 
little or no effort to hold individuals accountable for the post-
election violence.272  As of early 2014, apparently only twenty-
four suspects had been convicted in the more than 6,000 cases 
that had been pending for potential domestic prosecution.273  
Further, in February 2014, the Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions declared that it was dropping 4,000 cases because 
they were impossible to prosecute.274  Likewise, many 
interviewees stated that the Kenyatta government had made it 
clear that it would not be seeking to prosecute perpetrators of the 
violence.275  President Kenyatta’s State of the Nation address in 
early 2015 supports that conclusion.  There, Kenyatta indicated 
that successful prosecutions would face difficulties due to 
“inadequate evidence, inability to identify perpetrators, 
witnesses [sic] fear of reprisals, and the general lack of technical 
and forensic capacity.”276  He also confirmed as much, stating 
that national efforts would be restorative in nature, not 
retributive.277 
270 Interview with Subject 582, 568. 
271 Interview with Subject 568. 
272 ONE YEAR IN OFFICE, supra note 215, at 14. 
273 Id. 
274 See Luke Moffett, After the Collapse of the Kenyatta Case, How is the ICC 
Supposed To Help Victims?, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 10, 2014, 6:38 AM), 
http://theconversation.com/after-the-collapse-of-the-kenyatta-case-how-is-the-icc-
supposed-to-help-victims-34991.U.N. 
275 Interview with Subject 333. 
276 Victor Tinto, Full State of the Nation Address by President Uhuru Kenyatta, 
NEWS24 KENYA (Mar. 26, 2015, 6:30 PM), http://m.news24.com/Kenya/MyNews 
24/Full-State-of-the-Nation-address-by-president-Uhuru-Kenyatta-20150326. 
277 Id. 
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During this same time period, Kenya’s leaders have also 
refused to embrace the ICC processes as a mechanism to redress 
the harms suffered by the many victims of the violence.278  
Instead, Kenyan leaders have made numerous attempts to rid 
themselves of the ICC.  Only a few days after the announcement 
of the names of the suspects in December 2010, the Kenyan 
government passed a motion to withdraw from the ICC279—even 
though polls at that time showed that most ordinary Kenyans 
supported having the cases tried in the ICC so that perpetrators 
of the violence would not enjoy impunity.280  The Kenyan  
Parliament again voted to withdraw from the court in September 
2013.281  Further, a member of parliament submitted a resolution 
to repeal the 2008 International Crimes Act.282 
In addition, Kenya has lobbied the international community 
and the ICC in an effort to have the cases halted.283  In early 
2011, Kenya was successful in its bid to get the African Union to 
back a request to have the ICC cases deferred so that Kenya 
could try the cases locally.284  Kenya took that same request to 
the U.N. Security Council in 2011, but it was denied.285  In 2013, 
the U.N. Security Council again rejected Kenya’s bid to have it 
278 See Kenya President: International Criminal Court Not Impartial, VOA 
NEWS (Dec. 12, 2016, 9:21 AM), http://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-president-intern 
ational-criminal-court-not-impartial/3632789.html. 
279 Michael Onyiego, Kenya’s Politicians Look To Withdraw from ICC as 
Suspects Named, VOA NEWS (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.voanews.com/a/kenyas-
politicians-look-to-withdraw-from-icc-as-suspects-named--111998579/157058.html; 
see Kenya President: International Criminal Court Not Impartial, supra note 278. 
280 James Verini, The Prosecutor and the President, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 22, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/magazine/international-criminal-court-
moreno-ocampo-the-prosecutor-and-the-president.html. 
281 MG Zimeta, What Kenya’s Withdrawal Means for the International Criminal 
Court, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2013, 11:41 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/com 
mentisfree/2013/sep/06/kenya-withdrawal-icc-credibility. 
282 See Mark Kersten, The ICC and Kenya Parting Ways? What It Means and 
What It Doesn’t, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Sept. 5, 2013), http://justiceinconflict.org/ 
2013/09/05/icc-and-kenya-parting-ways-what-it-means-and-what-it-doesnt/ 
(referencing a motion to repeal the International Crimes Act). 
283 Michael Onyiego, Kenya Seeks Another Way To Stall Hague Proceedings, 
VOA NEWS (Mar. 20, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/kenya-seeks-
another-way-to-stall-hague-proceedings-118352894/136823. [hereinafter Onyiego, 
Kenya Seeks Another Way]. 
284 Michael Onyiego, Criticism as Kenya Lobbies U.N. for ICC Deferral, VOA 
NEWS (Mar. 6, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/criticism-as-kenya-
lobbies-un-for-icc-deferral-117527313/157598.html. 
285 See id. (noting the AU’s approval to seek deferral); Onyiego, Kenya Seeks 
Another Way, supra note 283. 
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intervene to halt the ICC cases.286  In proceedings before the ICC 
itself, the Kenyan defendants challenged the ICC’s jurisdiction 
claiming that Kenya should be permitted to try any cases 
domestically.287  The ICC denied that motion on the grounds that 
there were no national proceedings involving the same crimes 
and the crimes met the threshold of gravity to fall within the 
court’s jurisdiction.288 
After Kenyatta and Ruto assumed their positions as 
president and deputy president, the evidence arguably supports a 
conclusion that the ICC’s demonstrated threat to prosecute may 
have produced a perverse effect:  It pushed the country’s leaders 
into a corner, and they responded by taking actions to ensure 
that they would not be held accountable for any human rights 
abuses.289  After gaining power in March 2013, Kenyatta and 
Ruto continued their campaign against the ICC.290  They also 
used their position as leaders to assist those lobbying efforts.291  
They lobbied the African Union to urge the ICC against 
prosecuting heads of state.  At the time the ICC brought its cases 
against Kenyatta and Ruto, they were not heads of state. 
Nevertheless, the African Union was persuaded, and in October 
2013, it issued a call to halt the ICC case against Kenyatta and 
any sitting presidents going forward.292 
Further, in a report that Kenyatta submitted to parliament 
together with his State of the Nation address in early 2015, he 
requested the parliament to act upon the resolution that was 
passed several years ago to break with the ICC:   
286 See Michelle Nichols, Africa Fails To Get Kenya ICC Trials Deferred at 
United Nations, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2013, 4:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ar 
ticle/2013/11/15/us-kenya-icc-un-idUSBRE9AE0S420131115. 
287 Onyiego, Kenya Seeks Another Way, supra note 283. 
288 Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of 
the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, ¶¶ 187, 198–00 (Mar. 31, 2010). 
289 See Verini, supra note 280. 
290 See Marlise Simons & Jeffrey Gettleman, International Criminal Court 
Drops Case Against Kenya’s William Ruto, N.Y. TIMES (April 5, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/africa/william-ruto-kenya-icc.html 
[hereinafter Simons & Gettleman, ICC Drops Case]. 
291 See id. 
292 See African Union Urges ICC to Defer Uhuru Kenyatta Case, BBC NEWS (Oct. 
12, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24506006. 
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The National Executive is aware that the National Assembly of 
the 10th Parliament approved a resolution “To Suspend Any 
Links, Cooperation and Assistance” with the ICC.  This position 
was subsequently affirmed by a Resolution of the National 
Assembly on 5th September, 2013 and by the Senate on 11th 
September, 2013 respectively.  Parliament is urged to take such 
necessary measures to ensure the actualization of this 
resolution but to do so in a manner that respects our 
Constitutional Order.293 
Finally, our interviews indicate that while the new 
constitution remains in place, the Kenyan government is 
nevertheless rolling back reforms contemplated by that 
document.294  Kenyatta, for example, allegedly replaced 
individuals from the judiciary with those friendly to the 
establishment.295  Documentary data and statements during 
interviews also indicate that Kenyatta is working to silence civil 
society.296  According to Human Rights Watch, in 2011, Ruto told 
local NGOs to stop asking their foreign donors to support the ICC 
intervention and compiling reports about the post-election 
violence.297  In addition, Kenyatta and Ruto branded all of 
Kenya’s civil society as their enemies and as the pawns of 
foreigners298 in response to a lawsuit brought by several local 
non-profits that argued the two should not be able to run for 
office because the ICC indictments showed that they did not meet 
new Constitutional requirements calling for public officials to 
have integrity.299 
293 Tom Maliti, Kenyan President and Attorney General Make Contradictory 
Statements on ICC, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (May 13, 2015), http://www.ijmonitor.o 
rg/2015/05/kenyan-president-and-attorney-general-make-contradictory-statements-
on-icc/. 
294 Interview with Subject 475. 
295 Interview with Subject 591. 
296 See Sara Bessell, Kenyan Civil Society Under Threat, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 
(Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2013/11/15/kenyan-civil-society-
under-threat. 
297 See Kenya: Rights Defenders Under Attack, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 4, 
2013, 4:34 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/04/kenya-rights-defenders-und 
er-attack. 
298 See id. 
299 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenyan Court Rejects Suit Against Presidential 
Candidate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/16/world/ 
africa/kenyan-court-rejects-suit-against-kenyattas-candidacy.html. 
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The Kenyatta government also put forward a bill to limit 
foreign funding for NGOs in Kenya—which would mean that 
many could not continue to exist.300  The bill was defeated, but 
the government has still deregistered some organizations, 
claiming, for example, that they were linked to terrorism.301  Civil 
society is even under attack at the ICC.  Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s 
lawyers have claimed that the ICC witnesses against them have 
been coached to lie by human rights activists in Kenya who 
receive backing from foreign donors.302 
2. Assessing the Social Deterrent Effect
The evidence of a social deterrent effect during this time
period again seems weak.  The international community put 
significant pressure on Kenya leading up to the presidential 
elections.  The United Kingdom, France, and the United States 
were all arguing against having Kenyatta and Ruto run for office 
and seemed to be backing Odinga.303  Those countries stated 
publicly that they would cut off diplomatic relations with Kenya 
if the ICC indictees succeeded in their election campaign.304  
Johnnie Carson, a senior official in the U.S. State Department, 
went on record opposing the duo’s campaign, stating “choices 
have consequences.”305  But all of the West’s warnings seem to 
have fallen on deaf ears:  Kenyatta and Ruto ran for office and 
300 See Maina Kiai, In Kenya, Averting a Move to Strangle Civil Society with the 
Financial Noose, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.opende 
mocracy.net/openglobalrights/maina-kiai/in-kenya-averting-move-to-strangle-civil-
society-with-financial-noose; see also interview with Subject 582. 
301 Interview with Subject 582, 822. 
302 See Walter Menya, State Targeting US over Support for Hague Cases, Civil 
Society Protests, DAILY NATION (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/ 
politics/Civil-Society-ICC-Hague-Cases-Jubilee-Government/-/1064/2499628/-
/kylkb4z/-/index.html. 
303 Interview with Subject 338. 
304 See Stephen Brown & Rosalind Raddatz, Dire Consequences or Empty 
Threats? Western Pressure for Peace, Justice and Democracy in Kenya, 8 J. E. AFR. 
STUD. 43, 51, 53 (2014); see also Alex Perry, Kenya’s Election: What Uhuru 
Kenyatta’s Victory Means for Africa, TIME (March 9, 2013), http://world. 
time.com/2013/03/09/kenyas-election-what-uhuru-kenyattas-victory-means-for-
africa/; Joint Report, ICC: Are Kenya’s Allies Ready To Abandon their Strategic 
Interests?, THE EAST AFRICAN (Feb. 16. 2013, 6:08 PM), http://www.th 
eeastafrican.co.ke/news/Will-Kenya-Western-allies-abandon-strategic-interest/-
/2558/1696134/-/jrnu0h/-/index.html. 
305 See Gabe Joselow, US Official Says Kenya’s Elections Have ‘Consequences’, 
VOA NEWS (Feb. 7, 2013, 10:42 AM), http://www.voanews.com/content/us-official-
says-kenya-elections-have-consequences/1599063.html. 
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won using a campaign strategy that billed the ICC as anti-
African and a tool of the neo-colonialist West “to limit the control 
wielded by Kenya’s political elites.”306  And they turned Carson’s 
statement against him, reportedly responding to this “Western 
interference” by stating “they said choices have consequences: we 
will show them.”307  Not only did the international community’s 
“shaming” have no apparent effect, but also the West did not hold 
long to its threats about cutting off contact with Kenyan leaders. 
Notwithstanding that Kenyatta was still facing ICC charges, in 
2013 and 2014, respectively, then-UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron and then-President Barack Obama welcomed Kenyatta 
to their countries.308 
On the domestic side, the evidence also shows a push for 
accountability.  The civil society organization, Kenyans for Peace 
with Truth and Justice, urged Kenyan leaders to bring to justice 
the perpetrators of the post-election violence.309  Initially, the 
Kenyan public was pushing for trials in The Hague.  In October 
2010, before the ICC prosecutor released the names of the 
suspects, 68% of Kenyans supported the ICC.  But Kenyan 
leaders opted for obstruction, rather than accountability,310 and 
they reaped rewards for doing so:  In March 2013, the populace 
chose Kenyatta and Ruto to govern.  Further, it seems that the 
anti-ICC campaign strategy also worked.  By mid-2013, support 
for the ICC had dropped to 39%—with only 7% of those polled in 
the Central Province and 24% of those polled in the Rift Valley 
supporting trials in The Hague.311 
306 Interview with Subject 333; see Lynch, supra note 242, at 105. 
307 Interview with Subject 333. 
308 Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta To Meet UK's David Cameron, BBC NEWS (May 6, 
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22425869; Jibril Adan, President 
Obama Meets Kenyatta at White House Dinner, Says He is Proud of His African 
Roots, THE STAR (KENYA) (Aug. 6. 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.the-star.co.ke/ 
news/2014/08/06/president-obama-meets-kenyatta-at-white-house-dinner-says-he-is-
proud_c983653. 
309 TJRC FINAL REPORT – VERSION IV, TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION 36 (2013), http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1006&context=tjrc. 
310  Ipsos Synovate  Confirmation Hearings Boost Support for ICC Process, 2 
(Nov. 4, 2011) 
311 Id. 
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D. The Aftermath: Post-December 2014
After the OTP withdrew the charges against Kenyatta, the
Kenya cases included only Ruto and Sang.312  After several 
delays, the ICC trial against the two defendants began on 
September 10, 2013.313  The trial was suspended at the end of 
September 2013 to allow Ruto time to address a terrorist attack 
in Nairobi.314  Proceedings against Ruto subsequently continued, 
but he successfully convinced the court to permit him to be 
absent.  In early 2014, the Trial Chamber ruled that Ruto’s 
presence would not be required except for key hearings, provided 
that a waiver is filed.315 
As it had in the Kenyatta case, the ICC prosecutor also 
argued that it was facing problems with witness intimidation in 
its case against Ruto.316  In late June 2015, ICC prosecutors 
reported that they had tapes of conversations indicating that 
persons purporting to act on behalf of Ruto were bribing and 
intimidating witnesses.317  Although Ruto’s lawyers denied the 
charges, the Trial Chamber was persuaded that the prosecutor’s 
allegations of witness intimidation had some merit.  The Trial 
312 The OTP has issued arrest warrants for Walter Osapiri Barasa, a journalist, 
Philip Kipkoech Bett, and Paul Gicheru, a lawyer. See Prosecutor v. Barasa, Case 
No. ICC-01/09-01/13, Warrant of Arrest (Aug. 2, 2013), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/courtrecords/cr2013_06445.pdf; see also Prosecutor v. Gicheru, Case No. ICC-
01/09-01/15, Order Unsealing the Warrant of Arrest and Other Documents (Sept. 10, 
2015). 
313 See Mike Corder, Trial Starts for Kenya Deputy President Ruto, YAHOO NEWS 
(Sept. 10, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/trial-starts-kenya-deputy-president-ruto-
074906970.html. 
314 ICC Allows William Ruto To Leave Hague over Westgate Attack, Daily Nation 
(Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/ICC-allows-William-Ruto-to-
leave-Hague-over-Westgate-attack/1064-2003820-nchne3/index.html. 
315 Press Release, ICC, Trial Chamber V(A) Conditionally Excuses William 
Samoei Ruto from Continuous Presence at the Trial Starting on 10 September 2013 
(June 18, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr920&ln=en. 
316 In fact, in March 2015, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II granted the ICC 
prosecutor’s request to issue arrest warrants for two individuals for their alleged 
roles in corruptly inducing prosecution witnesses to withdraw as witnesses or recant 
their prior statements to the prosecutor. See Statement, ICC OTP, Statement of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Regarding the 
Unsealing of Arrest Warrants in the Kenya Situation (Sep. 10, 2015), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-10-09-2015-2; see also 
Prosecutor v. Gicheru, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/15, Order Unsealing the Warrant of 
Arrest and Other Documents (Sept. 10, 2015). 
317 Judie Kaberia, Prosecution Says it Has Evidence of Ruto ICC Witness 
Bribery, CAPITAL NEWS (June 25, 2015, 4:09 PM), http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/ne 
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Chamber ruled that the prosecutor would be permitted to admit 
the prior recorded testimonies of witnesses against Ruto in the 
trial inasmuch as the “element of systematicity of the 
interference of several witnesses in this case which gives rise to 
the impression of an attempt to methodically target witnesses of 
this case in order to hamper the proceedings.”318 
The OTP’s case against Ruto was weakened in February 
2016 when the ICC’s Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Court’s 
decision on witness statements.319  The Appeals Chamber 
concluded that the Trial Chamber incorrectly relied on Rule 68 of 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence to permit previously recorded 
witness statements to be introduced for the truth of their 
contents.320  However, the Appeals Chamber noted that the 
relied-upon provisions in Rule 68 only came into force in 
November 2013—after the trial against Ruto and Sang had 
commenced.321  The Appeals Chamber stated that applying that 
rule retroactively to the detriment of the accused would be 
improper.322  Because of this decision, the ICC Trial Chamber 
would not be able to consider the recorded witness statements in 
making their determination on the Ruto and Sang case.  Shortly 
after the Appeals Chamber’s decision, in April 2016 an ICC Trial 
Chamber vacated the OTP’s cases against both Ruto and Sang.323 
318 Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Prosecution 
Request for Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony ¶ 60 (Aug. 19, 2015). 
319 See Walter Menya, Big Win for Ruto as Judges Reject Recanted Evidence, 
DAILY NATION (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Big-win-for-Ruto-as-
judges-reject-recanted-evidence/-/1056/3074470/-/eoydu0z/-/index.html (“Deputy 
President William Ruto and Joshua arap Sang made a giant step towards acquittal 
of crimes against humanity charges after the International Criminal Court Appeals 
Chamber reversed the earlier decision that allowed the use of unsworn witness 
statements.”). 
320  Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Judgment on the Appeals of 
Mr. William Samoei Ruto and Mr. Joshua Arap Sang Against the Decision of Trial 
Chamber v. (A) of 19 August 2015 Entitled Decision on Prosecution Request for 
Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony ¶ 3 (Feb. 12, 2016) (Rule 68 allows witness 
statements to be admitted in evidence against the accused where there is a finding 
of witness interference.). 
321 Id. ¶ 81. 
322 Id. ¶ 96; see also Tom Maliti, Appeals Chamber Reverses Decision on Witness 
Statements, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.ijmonitor.org/2016 
/02/appeals-chamber-reverses-decision-on-witness-statements/. 
323 Simons & Gettleman, ICC Drops Case, supra note 290. 
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Characterizing the ICC’s level of intervention up until late 
2015 when our interviews in Kenya concluded presents an initial 
challenge before discussing any evidence of a deterrent effect or 
lack thereof.  In one sense, the level of intervention is quite high 
as the ICC was proceeding with prosecutions against Ruto and 
Sang.  It was demonstrating its willingness and ability to carry 
out the threat of prosecution that is relevant to the cost side of 
the deterrence calculus.  Other evidence, though, shows a 
somewhat weakened ICC threat because of defeats the OTP 
suffered.  The OTP was forced to drop its cases against Muthaura 
and Kenyatta—forced because Kenya allegedly obstructed the 
court’s ability to gather evidence and convince witnesses to 
testify.  Further, and related to the case against Ruto and Sang, 
although a trial court concluded that Ruto himself tampered with 
witnesses, the OTP then lost a legal battle.  The outcome was 
that the OTP could not use recanted, but previously recorded 
witness statements, in its trial against Ruto and Sang. 
Reaching definitive conclusions about whether the ICC 
produced a deterrent effect during this time period also poses a 
challenge given the fact that our interviews with high-level 
subjects in Kenya ended in October 2015.  Our tentative 
conclusion is that even after the OTP suspended its case against 
Kenyatta, the ICC still had some power to deter.324  After all, as 
stipulated by interviewees, the case against Kenyatta was only 
suspended, which technically means that the OTP can reopen it 
with new evidence.325  In addition, interviewees said that the fact 
that the charges were still pending against Ruto in late 2015 
played a role in keeping elites from orchestrating any ethnic 
violence.  One interviewee specifically stated that the fact that 
the ICC was still pursuing Deputy President Ruto was “holding 
back political violence.”326  Others said that the pending ICC 
cases continued to instill some level of fear in Kenyans and the 
notion that no one is above the law.327  Yet, the interviewees did 
not necessarily view this absence of violence as permanent. 
Other interviewees hypothesized that “tensions may increase 
when people realize that perpetrators can just do whatever they 
want” and seem to be able “to go back and forth to The Hague” 
324 Interview with Subject 568, 951. 
325 Interview with Subject 822, 859. 
326 Interview with Subject 576. 
327 Interview with Subject 568, 234, 219. 
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without any repercussions.328  Another interviewee argued that 
the fact that “people [in Kenya] are praying for the suspects, and 
not for the victims” suggests that the ICC’s presence has not 
produced a lasting change in how people in Kenya view 
violence.329 
Further, a number of interviewees said that they were not 
certain that the 2017 elections would be peaceful like the 
elections in 2013.330  Many expressed the view that the outcome 
of the Ruto case could significantly impact the security situation 
in Kenya.  Some believed that a Ruto conviction would harm the 
Jubilee Coalition, a coalition that was able to bring together two 
different ethnic groups that had previously done battle during 
elections.331  Others went even further and cautiously predicted 
that a Ruto conviction could trigger ethnic violence.332  An 
opinion poll echoes this sentiment, revealing that the majority of 
the population expected ethnic violence if the ICC did convict 
Ruto.333  We heard reports of celebrations amongst the Kikuyu 
people when the ICC dropped its case against Kenyatta.334  Ruto’s 
Kalenjin followers apparently believed that the ICC case against 
him should also be dropped.  One interviewee recommended this 
way forward—dropping the Ruto case—so as to avoid any 
tensions.335  Ruto’s supporters, in fact, have alleged that 
Kenyatta has abandoned Ruto, making him fight against the ICC 
on his own.336  A quote by one governor in September 2015 is 
328 Interview with Subject 234, 417. 
329 Prayer rallies were organized to support Ruto and Sang, with some 
controversy, as the Kenyan government allegedly has paid members of parliament to 
attend such rallies. Citizen Reporter, Gov’t Paying MPs To Attend ICC Prayer 
Rallies - Wetangula, CITIZEN DIGITAL (Oct. 21, 2015), https://citizentv.co.ke/news/g 
ovt-paying-mps-to-attend-icc-prayer-rallies-wetangula-103690/. 
330 Interview with Subject 475. 
331 Interview with Subject 349, 576, 475, 219, 951. 
332 Interview with Subject 719, 859, 444, 219. 
333 Kipchumba Some, Survey: Kenyans Foresee ICC Conviction, IPSOS (May 31, 
2015) http://www.ipsos.co.ke/NEWBASE_EXPORTS/Synovate/150531_The%20Stan 
dard%20on%20Sunday_6_99aae.pdf. 
334 Interview with Subject 333; see also Simons & Gettleman, International 
Court, supra note 268; see also Fredrick Nzwili, Kenyans Rejoice at Collapse of ICC 
Case Against President Kenyatta, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Dec. 5, 2014) 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2014/1205/Kenyans-rejoice-at-collapse-of-
ICC-case-against-President-Kenyatta-video. 
335 Interview with Subject 234. 
336 Silas Apollo, Kalenjins To Weigh Support for Uhuru over Ruto ICC Case, 
Says Ruto, DAILY NATION (Sept. 19, 2015), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/ 
politics/Uhuru-has-abandoned-his-deputy/-/1064/2877410/-/sel3bm/-/index.html 
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illustrative: “We are still seeking answers as to why the deputy 
president still has a case at the ICC yet the President is a free 
man.”337  Some allegations go further and accuse Kenyatta of 
“fixing” the evidence so that Ruto was brought before the ICC in 
the first place.338  According to one submission: “We have no 
option to conclude that Uhuru Kenyatta did everything to get 
Ruto to The Hague and has done nothing to get Ruto out of The 
Hague.”339  In other words, elites seem to be setting the stage for 
pitting one ethnicity against the other as they have done in the 
past when the stakes are high. 
In sum, the evidence suggests some “at the moment” legal 
deterrent effect in that Kenya is not currently experiencing any 
ethnic violence.  However, the evidence does not unequivocally 
show that the ICC’s intervention has caused people in Kenya to 
forever renounce violence or the threat of violence. 
Finally, there is also little evidence suggesting any social 
deterrent effect during this time period.  Telling is the fact that 
President Barack Obama visited Kenya in July 2015, meeting 
with President Kenyatta who had only recently been the subject 
of an ICC indictment for allegedly committing crimes against 
humanity.340  George Kegoro, Executive Director of the Kenyan 
Section of the International Commission of Jurists, stated that 
Obama’s visit departs from the “choices have consequences” 
warning.  It suggests that in fact “no choices have 
consequences.”341  Kegoro further opined that the visit helped 
Kenya regain acceptance by the international community and 
move away from its pariah status.342  Our interviewees made 
(quoting the governor Ruto saying that his people feel cheated by what they see as a 
lack of commitment by Kenyatta to help end the ICC case against Deputy President 
Ruto). 
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similar points.  They believed that Obama’s visit to Kenya helped 
the Kenyan leadership to rehabilitate the country’s image.  The 
visit thus has had a “legitimizing force.”343 
CONCLUSION 
This case study of Kenya’s interactions with the ICC over 
time reveals the complexities of gauging the ICC’s deterrent 
power and the need to have a greater understanding of how 
deterrence works and what factors influence whether and under 
what conditions the ICC should or should not be able to deter. 
We used a deep dive narrative with on-the-ground evidence from 
Kenya to “unpack” the ICC’s deterrent effect.  The Kenya case 
study has demonstrated that deterrence, or lack thereof, varies 
over time and as regards different actors in different situations. 
The evidence shows that ratification alone did not produce a 
deterrent effect, nor did it lead to a decrease in mass atrocities or 
an increase in domestic mechanisms available to punish abuses. 
On the other hand, the evidence showed that higher levels of ICC 
intervention, investigations and prosecutions, seem to have led to 
a decrease in mass atrocities. 
Nonetheless, the evidence does not thus far show that the 
ICC has produced a lasting deterrent effect in Kenya:  The 
evidence does not confirm normative change with respect to 
instrumentally inciting violence or permitting impunity.  Kenyan 
leaders allegedly committed human rights abuses in order to 
make the ICC evidence against them go away.  Moreover, 
interviewees did not say that large-scale violence was now 
something of the past.  Nor did they indicate that a new era has 
begun in Kenya where elites would be held accountable for their 
role in committing mass violence.  Several interviewees noted 
that Kenya seems to be back to “business as usual,” as 
democratic reforms envisioned by the 2010 constitution have 
been reversed,344 and ethnicity is again front and center in the 
election campaigns dividing the country and fueling tensions.345 
The evidence gathered in this Kenya case study also reveals 
an issue for the ICC going forward regarding its ability to deter 
criminal behavior when its interventions focus on state leaders of 
343 Interview with Subject 444. 
344 Interview with Subject 576. 
345 Interview with Subject 475, 219. 
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non-democracies or unconsolidated democracies.  Often these are 
the very people who are able to control the state machinery and 
as a result are not only able to frustrate the domestic criminal 
process, but also the ICC process that relies heavily on state 
cooperation.  This analysis is only a first step towards a greater 
understanding of the ICC’s deterrent effect.  Additional studies 
could help flesh out conditions that make it more likely that the 
ICC deters and produces the desired normative change and 
lasting deterrent effect, rather than an unintended or perverse 
effect.  Since some of the Kenya cases were dropped due to lack of 
evidence, future research could focus on how the ICC may best 
collect evidence at the outset of a case and when government 
leaders may not expect that they would be indicted, and thus, be 
more cooperative.  The use of plea agreements with cooperation 
provisions deserves further examination in this respect as well. 
In fact, the OTP has stated that it may start investigating some 
lower level perpetrators “in order to ultimately have a reasonable 
chance to convict the most responsible.”346  If the OTP has  
cooperating witnesses, then it should not have the same 
problems it has experienced in the Kenya cases with witnesses 
disappearing or recanting. 
Reframing the debate by unpacking the deterrent effect of 
the court allows for a more nuanced understanding that is 
necessary to ensure that the ICC carries out its mandate in a 
way that makes it most likely to produce the desired norm 
change and lasting deterrent effect envisaged by the drafters of 
the Rome Statute. 
346 ICC OTP, STRATEGIC PLAN JUNE 2012–2015 14 (Oct. 11, 2013), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Strategic-Plan-2013.pdf. 
